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NO	  CONTRACT?	  	  	  	  
Oren	  Bar-­‐Gill	  and	  Omri	  Ben-­‐Shahar†	  	  	  	  ABSTRACT	  	  “No	   Contract”	   is	   on	   the	   rise	   in	   many	   consumer	   markets.	   Sellers	   are	  luring	   customers	   with	   the	   assurance	   that	   no	   commitment	   is	  required—that	   the	   consumer	   can	   terminate	   the	   service	   freely	   at	   any	  time,	   without	   paying	   a	   termination	   penalty.	   What	   explains	   the	  increasing	   prevalence	   of	   No	   Contract?	   Is	   it	   welfare	   enhancing?	   We	  examine	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   No	   Contract,	   as	   compared	   to	   the	  lock-­‐in	   alternative,	   and	   conclude	   that	   the	   rise	   of	   No	   Contract	   is	  generally	   desirable,	   a	   market	   response	   to	   consumers’	   growing	  awareness	   and	   understanding	   of	   the	   costs	   of	   lock-­‐in.	   We	   argue,	  however,	  that	  lock-­‐ins	  continue	  to	  prevail	  less	  conspicuously,	  through	  loyalty	   programs	   that,	   like	   termination	   penalties,	   punish	   consumers	  for	   switching.	   	   Doctrinally,	   courts	   scrutinize	   lock-­‐in	   contracts	   as	  penalty	  liquidated	  damages,	  and	  reduce	  these	  fees	  when	  excessive.	  We	  show	  that	  while	  courts’	  skepticism	  of	  lock-­‐in	  is	  generally	  justified,	  the	  doctrinal	  method	  is	  fundamentally	  misguided,	  resulting	  in	  inconsistent	  and	   welfare-­‐reducing	   outcomes.	   In	   fact,	   with	   informed	   consumer	  choice	   disciplining	   sellers’	   actions,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   No	  Contract,	   the	   need	   to	   regulated	   this	   type	   of	   lock-­‐in	   contracts	   is	  diminishing.	  Consumers,	  however,	  are	  not	  as	  alert	  when	  joining	  loyalty	  programs,	   and	   the	   distortions	   arising	   form	   such	   lock-­‐ins	   are	  heightened,	   rather	   than	   resolved,	   by	   competition.	   Courts	   and	  regulators	  should	  be	  focusing	  their	  attention	  on	  loyalty	  programs,	  not	  early	  termination	  fees.	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   and	   the	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   of	   Chicago	   Law	  School,	   respectively.	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   thank	   Ian	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   Rick	   Brooks,	   Clay	   Gillette,	   William	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  Florencia	  Marotta-­‐Wurgler,	  Ariel	  Porat	  and	  workshop	  participants	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  and	  Yale	  Law	  School	  for	  helpful	  comments.	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INTRODUCTION	  	   A	   striking	   trend	   in	   consumer	   transactions	   is	   the	   rise	  of	   the	   “No	  Contract”	  contract.	  Businesses	  lure	  consumers	  with	  the	  assurance	  that	  no	   commitment	   is	   required—that	   the	   consumer	   can	   terminate	   the	  service	   freely	   at	   any	   time,	   without	   paying	   a	   termination	   penalty.	  Websites,	   storefront	   ads,	   billboards,	   and	   various	   marketing	   vehicles	  now	  carry	  the	  increasingly	  colloquial	  pledge	  of	  “No	  Contract.”	  	  
	  	   Initially	  emerging	  as	  a	  feature	  designed	  for	  consumers	  with	  low-­‐incomes	   and	   low	   credit	   ratings	   who	   did	   not	   qualify	   for	   purchases	  requiring	   a	   long-­‐term	   enforceable	   commitment,	   “No	   Contract”	   is	  quickly	   expanding	   to	   the	   entire	   market.	   Providers	   of	   cellphones,	  internet	   service,	   cable	   TV,	   security	   services,	   alarm	   systems,	   health	  clubs,	   and	   even	   bottled	  water	   suppliers	   now	   lure	   new	   customers	   by	  the	  comfort	  of	  “No	  Contract.”	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  “No	  Contracts”	  are	  contracts.	  They	  are	  legally	  binding	  like	   any	   other	   consumer	   contract.	   Consumers	   are	   obligated—most	  importantly,	   to	   make	   timely	   payments	   as	   long	   as	   they	   receive	   the	  services—and	   there	   is	   plenty	   of	   fine	   print,	   notwithstanding	   the	   oft-­‐used	   image	   in	   No	   Contract	   promotions	   suggesting	   no	   pre-­‐printed	  forms.	  This	   fine	  print	  binds	  consumers	   to	  many	  of	   the	  standard	   legal	  artifacts	   of	   present	   day	   consumer	   transactions,	   such	   as	   mandatory	  arbitration,	  disclaimers	  of	  warranties,	  subtle	  fees,	  and	  the	  seller’s	  right	  to	   modify	   the	   terms	   at	   any	   time.	   The	   service	   providers	   are	   also	  contractually	   obligated—most	   importantly,	   to	   provide	   the	   promised	  service	  at	  the	  promised	  rate.	  What	  the	  No	  Contract	  moniker	  intends	  to	  convey,	  and	  does	  so	  effectively	  and	  non-­‐deceptively,	  is	  that	  consumers	  are	  not	  going	  to	  be	  stuck	  prospectively	  with	  a	  contract	  they	  don’t	  like.	  If	  there	   is	   no	   long-­‐term	   commitment,	   no	   required	   duration	   (beyond,	  




usually,	   month-­‐to-­‐month),	   no	   termination	   fees	   or	   penalties,	   then	  consumers	  can	  enter	  the	  relationship	  with	  less	  anxiety.	  If	  the	  service	  is	  no	   longer	   desired,	   or	   its	   terms	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   unpleasant,	   or	   if	   they	  change	  unfavorably,	  or	  if	  the	  consumer	  can	  no	  longer	  afford	  it,	  then	  the	  consumer	  can	  terminate	  and	  exit	  with	  no	  cost	  and	  no	  hassle.	  	  There	   is	   much	   to	   be	   said	   about	   the	   choice	   of	   term	   “No	  Contract”—as	  a	  testament	  to	  consumers’	  growing	  frustration	  with	  fine	  print,	  hidden	   fees,	  and	   the	   social	  experience	   that	  underlies	  consumer	  contract	   law.	   But	   our	   interest	   in	   this	   paper	   is	   different.	  We	   want	   to	  examine	   whether	   these	   No	   Contracts	   truly	   serve	   the	   interests	   of	  consumers,	  which	  consumers	  benefit	   from	  No	  Contract,	  and	  why.	  We	  therefore	   employ	   economic	   analysis,	   bolstered	   by	   insights	   from	  cognitive	   psychology,	   to	   explain	   the	   emergence	   of	   this	   contractual	  form,	  to	  analyze	  its	  welfare	  implications,	  and	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  legal	  rules	  that	  regulate	  this	  practice.	  	  Our	  basic	   findings	  are	   the	   following.	  First,	   relative	   to	   long-­‐term	  lock-­‐in	   arrangements,	   No	   Contracts	   protect	   consumers	   against	   price	  increases.1	  But	   this	   freedom	   to	   exit	   and	  avoid	  price	  hikes	  means	   that	  consumers	   will	   also	   receive	   less	   upfront	   discounts	   and	   perks.	   A	  standard	   benchmark	   result	   in	   the	   economic	   literature	   on	   “switching	  costs”	   thus	   applies	   here:	   the	   overall	   price	   paid	   by	   consumers	   for	   the	  multi-­‐period	   service	   is	   independent	  of	   the	   contract	   form.	  No	  Contract	  means	  less	  price	  hikes	  and	  lower	  prices	  down	  the	  road,	  but	  this	  price	  saving—actuarially	   anticipated	  by	   sellers—is	   exactly	   offset	   by	  higher	  initial	   prices.	   Whether	   locked-­‐in	   or	   free	   to	   exit,	   consumers	   pay	   the	  same	   average	   periodic	   price.	   And	   this	   benchmark	   result	   is	  independent	  of	  the	  market	  power	  that	  the	  service	  provider	  potentially	  holds,	  or	  of	  the	  consumer’s	  time	  preferences.	  	  This	  basic	  invariance	  theorem	  holds	  regardless	  of	  how	  lock-­‐in	  is	  achieved.	   Firms	   can	   lock	   consumers	   into	   long-­‐term	   commitments	   in	  two	   ways:	   by	   charging	   fees	   for	   early	   termination,	   or	   by	   offering	  rewards	   for	   “loyalty.”	   Both	   contractual	   designs	   introduce	   an	   added	  cost	  to	  the	  consumer’s	  decision	  to	  switch.	  We	  show	  that	  the	  invariance	  result	  holds	  for	  both	  types	  of	  switching	  costs.	  Namely,	  both	  lead	  to	  the	  
                                                1	  As	   explained	   in	   Section	   I.A.	   below,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   arguably	   common	  scenario	  where	  sellers	  are	  unable	   to	  perfectly	  commit	  not	   to	  raise	  prices	   (or	  reduce	  quality).	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 same	  average	  price	  and	  the	  same	  consumer	  welfare	  as	  does	   the	   free-­‐exit	  No	  Contract	  design.	  	  	  This,	   however,	   is	   merely	   a	   methodological	   benchmark.	   As	   we	  relax	   the	   assumptions	   underlying	   the	   invariance	   result,	   we	   discover	  various	   general	   circumstances	   under	   which	   lock-­‐in	   makes	   matters	  worse	   for	   consumers,	   and	   reduces	  market	   efficiency	  overall.	   Some	  of	  these	   distortions	   occur	   even	   if	   consumers	   are	   perfectly	   rational:	   The	  strategic	  non-­‐uniform	  pricing	  portfolio	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  lock-­‐ins	  –	  that	  is,	  low	  prices	  in	  some	  periods	  and	  high	  prices	  in	  others	  –	  leads	  to	  inefficient	   quantities	   purchased	   by	   consumers.	   People	   buy	   too	  much	  when	   prices	   are	   artificially	   low	   (during	   the	   promotional	   phase)	   and	  too	   little	   when	   prices	   are	   jacked	   up	   (during	   the	   lock-­‐in	   phase).	  Moreover,	   long-­‐term	   lock-­‐in	   reduces	   flexibility	   and	   prevents	  consumers	  from	  adjusting	  to	  new	  market	  conditions	  and	  technologies	  by	  switching	  to	  better-­‐matched	  products.	  Finally,	  lock-­‐in	  contracts	  can	  deter	  entry	  by	  new	  sellers	  and	  thus	  stifle	  competition.	  	  Another	   important	   aspect	   of	   our	   analysis	   explores	   the	  distortions	   that	   lock-­‐in	   creates	   when	   consumers	   are	   imperfectly	  informed	   and	   imperfectly	   rational.	   Consumers	  who	   are	   not	   aware	   of	  termination	   penalties	   and	   who	   fail	   to	   anticipate	   the	   price	   increases	  that	   a	   lock-­‐in	   contract	   entails	  may	  be	   seduced	  by	   low	  upfront	  prices.	  And,	  sellers,	   through	  advertising	   that	  highlights	   immediate	  perks	  and	  discounts,	   can	   aggravate	   consumers’	   biased	   balancing	   of	   present	  versus	  future	  payoffs.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  No	  Contract	  arrangements	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  a	   market	   response	   to	   the	   inefficiencies	   of	   lock-­‐in.	   Consumers,	   who	  were	   long	   subject	   to	   cognitive	   biases	   and	   oversubscribed	   to	   services	  that	  locked	  them	  in,	  have	  learned	  to	  anticipate	  the	  hardship	  and	  regret	  that	  comes	  with	  a	  long-­‐term	  commitment—the	  “bill	  shock”	  (or	  “quality	  drop”)	  that	  often	  occurs	  in	  the	  late	  periods	  of	  the	  lock-­‐in	  contract.	  The	  reality	   of	   rapidly	   progressing	   technology,	   in	  which	   products	   become	  stale	   before	   the	   lock-­‐in	   period	   expires,	   has	   taught	   consumers	   to	  appreciate	   the	   cost	   of	   inflexibility	   that	   is	   associated	   with	   lock-­‐in	  contracts.	  These	  consumers	  are	  the	  target	  audience	  of	  billboards	  that	  trumpet	  the	  freedom	  of	  No	  Contracts	  –	  the	  same	  billboards	  that,	  in	  the	  not-­‐so-­‐distant	  past,	  lured	  them	  with	  sign-­‐up	  discounts	  and	  other	  front-­‐end	  perks.	  	  While	  No	  Contract	  responds	  to	  the	  growing	  savvy	  of	  consumers,	  correcting	  the	  various	  distortions	  that	  consumers	  now	  associate	  with	  long-­‐term	   lock-­‐ins,	  does	   it	   create	   its	  own	  new	  set	  of	  distortions?	  One	  




intuitive	   conjecture	   is	   that	   No	   Contract—like	   any	   type	   of	   short-­‐term	  contract—would	   lead	   to	   lower	   investment	   in	   product	   quality.	  Businesses	  that	  can	  no	  longer	  rely	  on	  a	  guaranteed	  duration	  of	  service	  and	   income	   from	   their	   customers	  would	   be	   reluctant	   to	  make	   costly	  investments	  in	  service	  infrastructure.	  And	  with	  the	  lower	  investment,	  the	   value	   of	   the	   service	   would	   likewise	   be	   lower.	   We	   demonstrate,	  however,	   that	   this	   concern	  may	  be	  misguided	   in	   two	  ways.	   First,	   the	  incentives	  to	  invest	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  greater	  under	  No	  Contract,	  because	  businesses—under	  the	  constant	  threat	  of	  customer	  exit—have	  to	  keep	  their	  customers	  happy	  all	  the	  time,	  by	  maintaining	  high-­‐quality	  service.	  Second,	  even	  if	  some	  types	  of	  investment	  are	  no	  longer	  made	  under	  No	  Contract,	   it	   may	   well	   be	   that	   this	   reduction	   is	   socially	   desirable,	  moderating	   a	   level	   of	   excessive	   investment	   that	   might	   otherwise	  persist.	  	  The	  economic	  analysis	  generates	  predictions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  markets	  where	  No	  Contract	   is	   likely	   to	  proliferate.	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  No	  Contract	  arrangement	  emerged	  originally	  in	  certain	  sub-­‐prime	  markets	  (e.g.,	  prepaid	  cellphones),	  to	  avoid	  the	  implicit	  borrowing	  that	  is	  embedded	   in	   long-­‐term	  service	  with	   low	  upfront	  prices.2	  But	  as	  No	  Contract	  proliferated	  it	  entered	  prime	  markets	  as	  an	  assurance	  against	  the	  hidden	  fees	  and	  surprise	  price	  hikes	  that	  many	  consumers	  learned	  to	  expect	   (and	  abhor).3	  In	   fact,	   rather	   than	  a	   carryover	   from	   the	   sub-­‐prime	  markets,	   No	   Contract	   can	   become	   a	   signal	   of	   quality:	   the	   best	  service	  providers	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  can	  better	  afford	  to	  offer	   the	   free	  termination	  option,	  because	  their	  customers	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  want	  to	  exercise	  it.	  	  This	  stock	  of	  economic	  insights,	  developed	  in	  Part	  I	  of	  the	  article,	  is	  then	  applied	  in	  Part	  II	  to	  examine	  the	  regulation	  of	  No	  Contract	  and	  lock-­‐ins	  under	  consumer	  contract	   law.	  The	  law	  has	  most	  prominently	  focused	   on	   the	   legality	   and	   enforceability	   of	   Early	   Termination	   Fees	  (“ETF”),	  which	  are	   the	  staple	  of	   lock-­‐in	  arrangements.	  Courts	  have	  at	  
                                                2 	  See,	   e.g.,	   OREN	   BAR-­‐GILL,	   SEDUCTION	   BY	   CONTRACT,	   LAW,	   ECONOMICS	   AND	  PSYCHOLOGY	   IN	   CONSUMER	   MARKETS,	   ch.	   4	   (2012).	   In	   other	   subprime	   markets	  lock-­‐in	  has	  been	  the	  norm.	  For	  example,	  prepayment	  penalties	  were	  common	  in	  the	  subprime	  mortgage	  market.	  Id,	  at	  ch.	  3.	  3	  See	  Lisa	  Tugend,	  Cellphone	  Service	  Without	  Signing	  on	  the	  Dotted	  Line,	  New	  York	  Times,	  February	  8,	  2013	  	  (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/your-­‐money/cellphone-­‐service-­‐without-­‐signing-­‐on-­‐the-­‐dotted-­‐line.html?emc=eta1&_r=0).	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 times	   struck	   these	   fees	  as	   “excessive”—applying	   the	  age-­‐old	   “penalty	  doctrine”	   that	   forbids	   over-­‐compensatory	   liquidated	   damages,	   or	  various	   provisions	   in	   states’	   consumer	   protection	   laws	   that	   serve	   a	  similar	   function.4	  Viewing	   ETFs	   as	   a	   form	   of	   liquidated	   damages	   for	  breach	   of	   the	   contract	   by	   consumers,	   courts	   have	   responded	   to	  consumer	  claims	  that	  ETFs	  must	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  exceed	  the	  seller’s	  lost	  profit	  from	  early	  termination.	  For	  example,	  when	  2-­‐year	  cellphone	  plans	   came	   with	   a	   fixed	   ($250)	   ETF,	   which	   would	   be	   levied	   even	   if	  termination	   occurred	   at	   the	   very	   end	   of	   the	   plan’s	   duration,	   courts	  vacated	  such	  provisions,	  thus	  moderating	  the	  lock-­‐in	  mechanism.5	  	  	  Our	   analysis	   suggests	   that,	   in	   a	   fundamental	  way,	   the	   question	  asked	   by	   courts—are	   ETFs	   over-­‐compensatory?—is	   the	   wrong	  question.	  ETFs	  are	  part	  of	  lock-­‐in	  contracts,	  in	  which	  consumers	  enjoy	  upfront	   discounts	   and	   sellers	   assume	   upfront	   losses.	   There	   is	   no	   a-­‐priori	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   higher	   upfront	   prices	   and	   lower	  ETFs	   are	  better,	  for	  consumers,	  than	  lower	  upfront	  prices	  and	  higher	  ETFs.	  And	  it	   is	  misguided	   to	   argue	   that	   back-­‐end	   ETFs	   overcompensate	   sellers,	  without	  considering	  the	  up-­‐front	  discounts	  that	  cut	  into	  sellers’	  profits.	  To	  be	  sure,	  lock-­‐in,	  and	  ETFs,	  can	  be	  harmful,	  as	  the	  economic	  analysis	  described	   above	   shows.	   But	   the	   sources	   of	   this	   harm	   are	   subtle	   and	  cannot	   be	   proven	  merely	   by	   pointing	   to	   high	   ETFs.	   Importantly,	   the	  ability	   to	   identify	   the	   incidence	   of	   harm	   is	   likely	   beyond	   the	  institutional	   competence	   of	   courts.	   Moreover,	   consumers’	   increasing	  sophistication	   about	   ETFs,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   No	   Contract,	  suggests	   that	   legal	   intervention	   may	   not	   be	   necessary,	   and	   may	  undermine	  consumers’	  choice	  among	  beneficial	  options.	  	  It	   is	   striking,	  however,	   that	   the	  movement	   towards	  No	  Contract	  and	   away	   from	   lock-­‐in	   has	   encompassed	   only	   the	   type	   of	   lock-­‐in	  achieved	  though	  termination	  penalties.	  It	  has	  not	  applied	  to	  the	  other	  type	   of	   lock-­‐in,	   achieved	   through	   loyalty	   rewards.	   Sellers	  may	   loudly	  advertise	   “No	   Termination	   Fees,”	   but	   we	   don’t	   see	   billboards	  trumpeting	   “No	  Loyalty	  Rewards.”	  This,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that—as	  our	  analysis	   clearly	   shows—loyalty	   rewards	   lead	   to	   many	   of	   the	   same	  distortions	   that	   penalty-­‐based	   lock-­‐ins	   create.	   We	   explore	   the	  behavioral-­‐psychological	  explanations	  for	  this	  pattern,	  why	  consumers	  are	   becoming	   increasingly	   sophisticated	   about	   ETFs,	   while	   failing	   to	  fully	   understand	   the	   costs	   of	   loyalty	   programs.	   We	   conclude	   that	  
                                                4	  See,	  e.g.,	  Cal.	  Civ.	  Code	  §	  1671.	  5	  See,	  e.g.,	  In	  re	  Cellphone	  Termination	  Fee	  Cases,	  193	  Cal	  App	  4th	  298,	  122	  Cal	  Rptr	   3d	   726	   (2011),	   rehg	   denied	   (Mar.	   24,	   2011),	   review	   denied	   (June	   15,	  2011),	  cert	  denied,	  132	  S	  Ct	  555,	  181	  L	  Ed	  2d	  397	  (2011).	  




courts	   and	   regulators,	   concerned	   about	   the	   distortions	   of	   lock-­‐in,	  should	  be	  focusing	  their	  attention	  on	  loyalty	  programs,	  not	  ETFs.	  
	  
	  
I.	  	  THE	  THEORY	  OF	  NO	  CONTRACT	  	  We	  want	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  consumers’	  freedom	  to	  switch	  among	   sellers.	   To	   that	   end,	   we	   set	   up	   a	   simplified	   scenario—a	  numerical	   example—and	   study	   how	   the	   freedom	   to	   switch	   affects	  prices,	   profits,	   consumer	   welfare,	   and	   efficient	   product	   matching.	  Methodologically,	  we	   begin	  with	  what	  we	   call	   an	   “invariance	   result.”	  This	   is	   a	   fundamental	   claim	   that,	   under	   some	   well-­‐specified	  assumptions,	   consumers’	   freedom	   to	   switch	   among	   sellers	   does	   not	  
matter.	  The	  overall	  price	  paid,	  products	  bought,	  and	  parties’	  welfare	  is	  invariant	   to	   the	   existence,	   or	   absence,	   of	   freedom	   to	   switch.	   This	  insight	   provides	   a	   useful	   benchmark	   for	   the	   subsequent	   analysis,	  which	   then	   relaxes	   the	   invariance	   assumptions	   one	   by	   one,	   and	  demonstrates	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  switch.	  	  
A.	  	  A	  Benchmark	  Invariance	  Result	  	  Two	   sellers,	   A	   and	  B,	   offer	   an	   identical	   product.	   There	   are	   two	  periods	   and	   in	   each	   period	   a	   single	   consumer	   is	   seeking	   to	   buy	   one	  unit.	   The	  price	   of	   the	  product	   can	  potentially	   vary	   across	   sellers	   and	  across	   time.	   Assume	   that	   there	   is	   price	   competition	   between	   sellers,	  complete	   information,	   and	   no	   discounting	   across	   periods.	   These	  assumptions	  will	  be	  relaxed	  later.	  	  Once	   the	   consumer	   chooses	   the	   period-­‐1	   seller,	   there	   are	   two	  possible	  contractual	  arrangements:	  	  
• No	  Contract	  –	   the	  consumer	  can	  switch	  at	   the	  end	  of	  period	  1	  from	  one	  seller	  to	  the	  other,	  at	  no	  cost.	  	  
• Lock-­‐in	   Contract	   –	   the	   consumer	   can	   switch	   at	   the	   end	   of	  period	  1	  only	  after	  paying	  the	  period-­‐1	  seller	  a	  termination	  fee	  that	  is	  specified	  in	  the	  contract.	  	  	  We	  begin	  the	  analysis	  by	  assuming	  that	  both	  sellers	  can	  produce	  each	  unit	  at	  a	  per-­‐unit	  cost	  of	  $100.	  We	  look	  at	  No	  Contract	  first,	  and	  then	  proceed	  to	  examine	  the	  alternative	  Lock-­‐in	  Contract,	  assuming	  a	  termination	  fee	  of	  $20.	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No	   Contract.	   In	   this	   case,	   competition	   between	   the	   two	   sellers	  will	   lead	  them,	  in	  each	  period,	  to	  set	  prices	  equal	  to	  the	  per-­‐unit	  cost,	  $100.	  Since	   the	  consumer	  can	  switch	  at	  no	  cost	   in	  period	  2,	  no	  seller	  can	  charge	  more	  than	  $100	  in	  this	  period	  (and	  will	  lose	  money	  if	  they	  charge	  less).	  Expecting	  to	  make	  no	  profit	  in	  period	  2,	  prices	  in	  period	  1	  must	  cover	  the	  period	  1	  cost,	  $100,	  and	  competition	  ensures	  that	  they	  will	  not	  exceed	  cost.	  Accordingly,	  both	  sellers	  will	  set	  a	  price	  of	  $100	  in	  period	  1	   as	  well.	  The	   consumer	  may	  buy	   from	  a	   single	   seller	   in	  both	  periods,	   or	   switch	   sellers	   after	   period	   1.	   The	   total	   price	   paid	   by	   the	  consumer	  over	  the	  two	  periods	  will	  be	  $200.	  	  	  
Lock-­‐in	   Contract.	   Begin	   by	   considering	   period	   2,	   after	   the	  consumer	  purchased	   from,	   say,	  Seller	  A	   in	  period	  1.	   If	   she	  stays	  with	  seller	   A	   in	   period	   2,	   then	   no	   termination	   fee	  will	   be	   paid.	   But	   if	   she	  switches	   to	  Seller	  B,	   the	  consumer	  will	   incur	  a	   switching	  cost	  of	  $20.	  Seller	  B	  might	   try	   to	   lure	   the	   consumer	   to	   switch,	  but	   it	   cannot	  offer	  the	  consumer	  a	  price	  lower	  than	  $100	  (any	  loss	  Seller	  B	  would	  incur	  in	  period	  2	  will	   not	   be	   recouped	  because	   this	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   the	   last	  period).	  Recognizing	  this,	  Seller	  A	  can	  charge	  the	  consumer	  a	  price	  of	  up	   to	   $120	   in	   period	   2	   without	   risking	   losing	   her	   business,	   thus	  earning	  a	  profit	  of	  up	  to	  $20.	  In	  period	  1	  the	  two	  sellers	  will	  compete	  to	  attract	  the	  consumer,	  and	  capture	  the	  opportunity	  to	  earn	  $20	  down	  the	   road,	  by	   setting	  below-­‐cost	  prices.	  Both	   sellers	  will	   set	   a	  price	  of	  $80	  –	  their	  per-­‐period	  cost	  of	  $100	  minus	  the	  expected	  period-­‐2	  profit.	  The	   consumer	  will	   buy	   from	   the	   same	   seller	   in	   both	   periods—she	   is	  indifferent	  between	  A	  or	  B—and	  will	  pay	  a	  pair	  of	  prices	  $80	  and	  $120	  in	  periods	  1	  and	  2,	   respectively,	   for	  a	   total	   two-­‐period	  price	  of	  $200.	  Because	  of	   the	   switching	  cost,	   the	  period-­‐1	   seller	  has	  ex	  post	  market	  power,	   which	   it	   uses	   to	   raise	   its	   period-­‐2	   price	   and	   earn	   a	   $20	   net	  profit.	  This	  profit,	  however,	  is	  perfectly	  offset	  by	  a	  discounted	  period-­‐1	  price.6	  	  Several	   comparisons	   emerge	   from	   this	   simple	   example.	   First,	  note	  that	  the	  total	  price	  in	  the	  No	  Contract	  case	  and	  the	  lock-­‐in	  case	  is	  identical,	   $200,	   equal	   to	   the	   two-­‐period	   production	   cost,	  2×$100 .	  Accordingly,	   the	  consumer	   is	   indifferent	  between	  the	  two	  contractual	  arrangements.	  This	  is	  the	  benchmark	  invariance	  result,	  and	  it	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  period-­‐2	  market	  power	  is	  fully	  anticipated	  in	  period	  1.	  Since	  the	  discount	  in	  period	  1	  arises	  directly	  from	  the	  potential	  profit	  
                                                6	  Our	   analysis	   of	   lock-­‐in,	   in	   this	   and	   subsequent	   sections,	   builds	   on	   Joseph	  Farrell	   and	   Paul	   Klemperer,	   Coordination	   and	   Lock-­‐In:	   Competition	   with	  Switching	   Costs	   and	   Network	   Effects,	   in	   M.	   ARMSTRONG	   AND	   R.	   PORTER	   (EDS.),	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  INDUSTRIAL	  ORGANIZATION,	  Vol.	  3,	  ch.	  31,	  Sec.	  2	  (2007).	  




in	   period	   2,	   its	   size	   exactly	   equals	   the	   size	   of	   the	   profit.	   Every	   $1	   of	  profit	  that	  a	  seller	  will	  be	  able	  to	  extract	  in	  period	  2	  from	  the	  locked	  in	  consumer	  raises	  by	  $1	  the	  discount	  that	  the	  seller	  is	  willing	  to	  give	  in	  period	  1	  in	  order	  to	  lure	  the	  consumer.	  	  Second,	   although	   the	   total	   two-­‐period	   price	   is	   invariant	   across	  contractual	   arrangements,	   the	   lock-­‐in	   switching	   cost	  has	   two	  distinct	  effects.	  Under	   the	   lock-­‐in	  arrangement,	   the	  consumer	  buys	   from	  only	  one	  seller;	  and	  the	  price	  increases	  over	  time.	  Such	  escalating	  prices	  are	  commonly	   observed	   in	   markets	   where	   lock-­‐ins	   are	   used.	   Sellers	  appear	  to	  compete	  over	  consumers	  more	  ferociously	  at	  the	  outset,	  by	  offering	   them	   perks	   in	   the	   form	   of	   discounts,	   “teaser”	   rates,	   signup	  gifts,	  or	   free	  bundled	  products.	  Once	  a	  consumer	   is	   committed,	  when	  the	  proverbial	  “period	  2”	  arrives,	  sellers	  raise	  prices	  and	  increase	  their	  per-­‐period	  profits.	  The	  difference	  between	   the	  period-­‐1	  and	  period-­‐2	  prices	  is	  determined	  solely	  by	  the	  switching	  costs.	  	  We	  will	  soon	  turn	  to	  examine	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  irrelevance	  result	   is	   violated,	   and	   in	   which	   lock-­‐in	   makes	   things	   worse.	   The	  inefficiencies	  will	  arise	   from	  the	  two	  effects	   just	   identified—the	  price	  distortions	  and	  the	  inability	  to	  switch.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  first	  show	  the	   robustness	   of	   the	   invariance	   result,	   by	   identifying	   some	   factors	  that	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  inefficiency	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  	  	  First,	   the	   invariance	   result	   is	   robust	   to	   discounting.	   It	  might	   be	  conjectured	   otherwise,	   that	   the	   period-­‐2	   effect	   is	   not	   offset	   by	   the	  period-­‐1	  effect,	  because	  it	   is	  discounted.	  To	  see	  why	  the	  invariance	  is	  preserved	   even	   if	   parties	   discount	   period-­‐2	   payoffs,	   consider	   a	  discount	   factor	   of	   10%.	   The	   No	   Contract	   prices	   will	   continue	   to	   be	  $100,	  $100	  across	  the	  two	  periods,	  but	  the	  lock-­‐in	  prices	  will	  now	  be	  $82,	   $120.	   The	   anticipated	   period-­‐2	   net	   profit	   of	   $20	   is	   worth,	   in	  period	  1,	  only	  $18	   to	   the	  seller	   (it	   is	  discounted	  by	  10%),	  and	  so	   the	  period-­‐1	   discount	   will	   be	   smaller.	   With	   these	   prices,	   the	   total	  discounted	  stream	  of	  prices	  that	  the	  consumer	  pays	  is	  again	  invariant	  across	  regimes	  –	  $190.	  Under	  No	  Contract,	  the	  total	  discounted	  price	  is	  100 + 0.9×100 = 190 ;	   under	   lock-­‐in	   the	   total	   discounted	   price	   is	  82 + 0.9×120 = 190.	   Every	   $1	   of	   profit	   that	   a	   seller	   will	   be	   able	   to	  extract	  in	  period	  2	  now	  reduces	  the	  price	  it	  charges	  in	  period	  1	  by	  the	  
present	  discounted	  value	  of	  a	  future	  $1—which	  is	  $0.90	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  10%	  discount.	  The	  delayed	  profit	  is	  exactly	  offset	  by	  the	  present	  loss.	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 Second,	   the	   invariance	   result	   applies	   if	   the	   contract	   has	   more	  than	  2	  periods.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  3	  period	  lock-­‐in	  contract	  with	  a	  $20	  termination	   fee	   in	   periods	   2	   and	   3,	   the	   prices	  will	   be	   $80,	   $100	   and	  $120	  in	  the	  three	  periods,	  compared	  to	  a	  fixed	  price	  of	  $100	  under	  No	  Contract	  (returning	  to	  the	  no	  discounting	  assumption).	  The	  total	  price	  summed	  up	  across	  periods	  continues	  to	  be	  invariant	  to	  the	  contractual	  structure—$300.7	  	  Finally,	   it	   may	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   invariance	   result	   can	   be	  strengthened	   further.	  We	   have	   shown	   that	   total	   price	   is	   invariant	   to	  the	  existence	  of	   contractual	   switching	  costs,	  but	  per-­‐period	  prices	  do	  vary	  from	  No	  Contract	  to	   lock-­‐in.	  Specifically,	  while	  per-­‐period	  prices	  remain	  unchanged	  with	  No	  Contract,	   lock-­‐in	  features	  price	  escalation.	  Couldn’t	   a	   lock-­‐in	   seller	   commit,	   contractually,	   to	   fixed	   per-­‐period	  prices?	   In	   our	   example,	   couldn’t	   the	   seller	   commit	   to	   set	   a	   price	   of	  $100	   in	   each	   of	   the	   two	   periods?	   With	   such	   a	   commitment,	   the	  invariance	   result	   would	   extend	   beyond	   total	   price	   to	   the	   per-­‐period	  prices.8	  	  	  Commitment	   is	   indeed	  possible,	   and	   it	   is	   definitely	   observed	   in	  consumer	  markets.	  For	  example,	  cellular	  service	  providers	  commit	  to	  a	  fixed	  monthly	  fee.	  Yet,	  the	  ability	  of	  sellers	  to	  commit	  is	  limited.	  First,	  sellers	  can	  “invent”	  new	  prices	  and	  fees	   in	  the	  second	  period.	   Indeed,	  new	   prices	   and	   fees	   are	   continuously	   introduced	   in	  many	   consumer	  markets.	   Examples	   include	   late-­‐payment	   fees,	   over-­‐the-­‐limit-­‐fees,	  roaming	   charges,	   no-­‐sufficient-­‐funds	   fees,	   cash-­‐advance	   fees,	   etc’.9	  Second,	   shifting	   focus	   from	   price	   to	   quality,	   sellers	   can	   reduce	   the	  quality	  of	  their	  product	  or	  service	  in	  the	  second	  period.	  Since	  quality	  is	  often	  less	  verifiable	  than	  price,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  contractually	  
                                                7	  Assuming	  the	  consumer	  chose	  Seller	  A	  in	  period	  1,	  in	  the	  last	  period,	  which	  is	  now	  period	  3,	  Seller	  A	  will	  set	  a	  price	  of	  $120	  (as	  it	  did	  in	  period	  2	  in	  the	  two-­‐period	  example).	   In	  period	  2,	   Seller	  B	  would	  be	  willing	   to	  offer	  a	  below-­‐cost	  price	  of	  $80,	  anticipating	  that	  if	  the	  consumer	  switches,	  Seller	  B	  will	  be	  able	  to	  recoup	  the	  $20	  loss	  in	  period	  3.	  To	  ensure	  that	  the	  consumer	  does	  not	  switch,	  Seller	  A	  cannot	  price	  above	  $100.	  Finally,	  in	  period	  1,	  the	  two	  sellers	  anticipate	  a	  $20	  profit	  in	  period	  3	  (and	  a	  break-­‐even	  price	  in	  period	  2),	  if	  they	  can	  attract,	  and	   lock-­‐in,	   the	   consumer.	   Therefore,	   the	   period	   1	   price	   will	   be	   competed	  down	  to	  $80.	  8	  In	  the	  basic	  setup,	  the	  seller	  might	  commit	  to	  any	  pair	  of	  prices	  that	  sum-­‐up	  to	  $200,	  e.g.,	  [$100,	  $100],	  [$80,	  $120]	  or	  [$120,	  $80];	  when	  we	  introduce	  the	  distortions	  that	  come	  with	  deviations	  from	  the	  [$100,	  $100]	  price	  schedule,	  it	  will	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  seller	  would	  want	  to	  commit	  to	  [$100,	  $100].	  9	  See	  Bar-­‐Gill,	   supra	  note	  2.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   there	   is	  also	  a	   trend	   towards	  price	   simplification	   and	   fee-­‐reduction.	   Id,	   ch.	   2	   (discussing	   Citi’s	   “Simplicity	  Card”).	  




commit	  in	  advance	  to	  fixed	  quality.10	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  important	  to	  study	  the	  implications	  of	  imperfect	  commitment.	  	  Imperfect	  commitment	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  At	   least	   some	   of	   the	   inefficiencies	   generated	   by	   lock-­‐in,	   as	   detailed	  below,	   follow	  from	  the	  escalating	  per-­‐period	  prices	   that	  are	  a	   feature	  of	   lock-­‐in	  with	   imperfect	   commitment.	  When	   perfect	   commitment	   is	  possible,	   rational	   consumers	  would	  demand	   that	   sellers	   exercise	   this	  commitment	   power	   to	   guarantee	   fixed	   per-­‐period	   prices;	   otherwise	  they	  would	  shun	  sellers	  with	  lock-­‐in	  contracts.	  But,	  again,	  this	  efficient	  rational-­‐expectations	  equilibrium	  requires	  perfect	  commitment,	  which,	  as	  argued	  above,	  will	  not	  always	  be	  available.	  	  
B.	  	  Loyalty	  Programs:	  Lock-­‐in	  with	  Carrots	  	  	  We	   have	   thus	   far	   focused	   on	   lock-­‐in	   enforced	   by	   termination	  penalties.	   The	   No	   Contract	   trend	   focuses	   on	   the	   removal	   of	   such	  penalties.	   But	   termination	   penalties	   are	   not	   the	   only	   contractual	  mechanism	   for	   increasing	   the	   cost	   of	   switching	   sellers.	   Loyalty	  programs	   that	   reward	   consumers	   for	   repeat	   purchases	   similarly	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  switching.	  A	  consumer	  who	  switches	  from	  Seller	  A	  to	   Seller	   B	   might	   gain	   a	   benefit,	   e.g.,	   a	   lower	   price	   or	   better-­‐quality	  service,	  but	  also	  incur	  a	  cost	   in	  the	  form	  of	   forgone	  loyalty	  rewards	  –	  rewards	   that	   can	   take	   the	   form	  of	  a	   free	   flight,	   a	  hotel	  discount,	   cash	  back,	   and	  more.	   Loyalty	   rewards	   thus	   constitute	   an	   opportunity-­‐cost	  termination	  penalty.	  Yet,	  the	  economic	  analysis	  of	  loyalty	  programs	  as	  lock-­‐in	   mechanisms	   is	   different	   from	   the	   economic	   analysis	   lock-­‐in	  enforced	  by	  termination	  penalties.	  The	  main	  difference	  is	  that,	  at	  least	  in	   the	  basic	  model,	   loyalty	   rewards	  are	  paid	  on	   the	  equilibrium	  path,	  whereas	  termination	  penalties	  are	  not.	  	  	  Consider	  the	  basic	  example	  above,	  but	  assume	  that	  Seller	  A	  uses	  a	   loyalty	   reward,	   rather	   than	  a	   termination	  penalty,	   to	   induce	   repeat	  business.	   Specifically,	   suppose	  Seller	  A	  offers	  an	  award	  of	  $20	   to	  any	  loyal	   customer	   who	   buys	   from	   this	   seller	   both	   at	   periods	   1	   and	   at	  period	  2.	  Assume	  that	  this	  award	  would	  be	  redeemable	  in	  period	  2.	  A	  consumer	  who	  purchased	  from	  Seller	  A	  in	  period	  1	  faces	  the	  following	  choice:	   Stay	  with	   Seller	   A	   in	   period	   2	   and	   redeem	   the	   $20	   award	   or	  
                                                10	  See	  also	  Farrell	  and	  Klemperer,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  Sec.	  2.3.2.	  
 12	   Bar-­‐Gill	  &	  Ben-­‐Shahar	   [February	  16	  
 switch	   to	   Seller	   B	   and	   forfeit	   the	   award.	   As	   with	   a	   termination	   fee,	  switching	  entails	  a	  cost	  –	  a	  $20	  cost.	  	  	  But	  while	  the	  termination	  fee	  was	  not	  paid	  by	  the	  consumer	  and,	  correspondingly,	  not	  received	  by	  the	  seller,	  the	  loyalty	  reward	  is	  paid	  by	   the	   seller	   and	   received	  by	   the	   consumer.	   Seller	  A	  must	   charge	   for	  this	   extra	   cost	   of	   doing	   business.	   There	   are	   two	  ways	   for	   Seller	   A	   to	  recoup	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  loyalty	  program:	  	  
Loyalty	   programs	   with	   an	   upfront	   fee:	   Seller	   A	   can	   charge	   an	  upfront,	  period	  1	   fee	   for	  participation	   in	   the	   loyalty	  program.	   Indeed,	  certain	  credit	  card	  issuers	  charge	  an	  upfront	  fee	  for	  enrollment	  in	  their	  loyalty	   programs.	   In	   the	   basic	   example,	   the	   effective	   period	   1	   price,	  inclusive	  of	  the	  enrollment	  fee,	  would	  be	  $120.	  The	  effective	  period	  2	  price,	   accounting	   for	   the	   $20	   loyalty	   reward,	   would	   be	   $80.	   Loyalty	  programs	  with	  an	  upfront	  fee	  reverse	  the	  price	  profile	  obtained	  when	  lock-­‐in	  is	  enforced	  using	  termination	  penalties.	  	  
Loyalty	   programs	   without	   an	   upfront	   fee:	   While	   some	   loyalty	  programs	  entail	  an	  upfront	  enrollment	  fee,	  others	  do	  not.	  For	  example,	  many	  airlines	  allow	  customers	  to	  enroll	  in	  their	  loyalty	  programs	  free	  of	   charge.	   How	   do	   these	   sellers	   cover	   the	   extra	   cost	   of	   the	   loyalty	  program?	  If	   the	  period	  1	  price	   is	  not	  used	  to	  cover	  this	  cost,	   then	  the	  period	  2	  price	  must.	   In	  the	  basic	  example,	  the	  nominal	  period	  2	  price	  would	   be	   $120,	   but	   since	   the	   consumer	   enjoys	   a	   loyalty	   reward	   in	  period	  2	  the	  effective	  period	  2	  price	  is	  $100,	  equal	  to	  the	  per-­‐unit	  cost	  of	   production.	   Moving	   back	   to	   period	   1,	   since	   Seller	   A	   expects	   zero	  profit	   in	   period	   2,	   the	   period	   1	   price	   will	   equal	   the	   per-­‐unit	   cost	   of	  $100.	  In	  a	  loyalty	  program	  without	  an	  upfront	  fee,	  price	  equals	  $100	  in	  each	  period,	  as	  in	  the	  No	  Contract	  case;	  but	  switching	  is	  deterred,	  as	  in	  the	  Lock-­‐in	  case	  with	  termination	  fees.	  	  The	   two	   options	   described	   above	   –	   loyalty	   programs	  with	   and	  without	  an	  upfront	   fee	  –	   should	  be	  seen	  as	   two	  ends	  of	  a	   continuous	  range.	   Seller	  A	   need	   not	   recoup	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   loyalty	   program	  only	  through	  the	  period	  1	  price	  (upfront	  fee)	  or	  only	  through	  the	  period	  2	  price	  (no	  upfront	  fee).	  Seller	  A	  can	  recover	  part	  of	  this	  cost	  in	  period	  1	  and	   the	   remainder	   in	   period	   2.	   Nevertheless,	   for	   expositional	  convenience	  we	  shall	  restrict	  our	  analysis	  to	  the	  two	  polar	  cases.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  benchmark	  invariance	  result	  holds	  for	  lock-­‐in	   that	   is	   enforced	   by	   loyalty	   programs,	   regardless	   of	   how	   the	  seller	   chooses	   to	  cover	   the	  cost	  of	   the	  program.	   In	  all	   cases,	   the	   total	  




effective	  price	  paid	  by	  the	  consumer,	  over	  the	  two	  periods,	  inclusive	  of	  the	  loyalty	  reward,	  is	  equal	  to	  $200.	  	  	  
C.	  	  The	  Cost	  of	  Lock-­‐in	  	  Like	  any	  invariance	  result,	  the	  useful	  way	  to	  think	  about	  it	  is	  not	  as	   an	   empirical	   prediction,	   but	   rather	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   further	  exploration	   of	   the	   underlying	   reasons	   why	   different	   contractual	  regimes	   do	   matter.	   That	   is,	   if	   in	   practice	   lock-­‐in	   is	   going	   to	   have	  differential	   effects	   on	   consumers,	   then	   these	   effects	   must	   arise,	   and	  should	   be	   traced	   to,	   not	   the	   obvious	   sources—the	   magnitude	   of	  switching	   costs,	   or	   discounting,	   or	   the	   duration	   of	   lock-­‐in—but	   to	  some	  less	  obvious	  sources.	  	  	  The	  analysis	  so	  far	  was	  based	  on	  several	  assumptions.	  When	  we	  relax	  some	  of	  these	  assumptions,	  the	  invariance	  result	  will	  vanish.	  This	  theoretical	   approach	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   identify	   the	   factors	   that,	   when	  interacting	   with	   switching	   costs,	   affect	   the	   welfare	   of	   sellers	   and	  consumers.	  Each	  of	   the	   following	  sections	   identifies	  a	  different	   factor	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  invariance	  result.	  	  1.	  	  Inefficient	  Quantity	  	  One	   of	   the	   differences	   between	   No	   Contract	   and	   Lock-­‐in,	   even	  when	  the	  price	  invariance	  holds,	  is	  the	  per-­‐period	  prices.	  Under	  lock-­‐in,	  the	  price	   is	   low	   in	  period	  1	   and	  high	   in	  period	  2.	  We	  will	   now	   show	  that	  this	  feature	  can	  lead	  to	  inefficiency.	  The	  intuition	  is	  the	  following:	  Prices	   affect	   the	   quantity	   served.	   When	   prices	   fall,	   more	   units	   are	  bought;	   and	   vice	   versa.	   A	   low	  price	   in	   period	   1	   and	   a	   corresponding	  high	  price	  in	  period	  2	  lead	  to	  inefficient	  quantities.	  	  	  The	   basic	  model	   assumed	   that	   the	   consumer	   seeks	   exactly	   one	  unit	   per	   period.	   Whether	   the	   price	   was	   $80,	   $100,	   or	   $120,	   the	  periodic	   quantity	   demanded	   was	   fixed	   at	   1.	   This,	   of	   course,	   is	  unrealistic.	  Imagine,	  instead,	  that	  the	  consumer	  is	  seeking	  up	  to	  three	  units	   per	   period,	   and	   that	   the	   marginal	   value	   per	   unit	   is	   declining.	  Specifically,	  in	  each	  period,	  the	  values	  the	  consumer	  attaches	  per	  unit	  are	  given	  in	  Table	  1:	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 Unit	   Value	  [$]	  1	   125	  2	   105	  3	   95	  	  Table	  1:	  Per-­‐Unit	  Values	  	  As	  before,	  we	  continue	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  production	  per	  unit	   is	   fixed	   at	   $100,	   that	   there	   are	   two	   periods,	   and	   that	   the	  termination	   fee	   under	   a	   lock-­‐in	   contract	   is	   $20.	  We	  make	   two	  more	  assumptions:	   First,	   there	   is	   no	   penalty	   for	   reducing	   the	   quantity	  purchased	   across	   periods.	   Under	   the	   lock-­‐in	   contract,	   the	   consumer	  can	   choose	   to	   buy	   less	   in	   period	   2	   than	   she	   did	   in	   period	   1.	   The	  termination	   penalty	   applies	   only	   if	   a	   consumer	   buys	   from	   another	  seller.	   Second,	   sellers	  are	   restricted	   to	   linear	  pricing,	   i.e.,	   they	  cannot	  vary	  the	  per-­‐unit	  price	  according	  to	  the	  number	  of	  units	  purchased.11	  	  In	  this	  setting,	  it	  is	  efficient	  to	  sell	  two	  units	  in	  each	  period.	  The	  net	  value	   for	  each	  of	   the	   first	   two	  units	   is	  positive,	  and	   the	   total	  per-­‐period	  surplus	  is	  30	  (=	  [125	  –	  100]	  +	  [105	  –	  100]).	  Purchasing	  a	  third	  unit	   is	   inefficient:	   it	   costs	   $100	   to	  produce,	   but	   generates	   only	   a	   $95	  value	  to	  the	  consumer.	  	  	  
No	  Contract.	   In	   this	  case,	   the	  price	  equals	  $100	   in	  both	  periods,	  and	  so	  the	  consumer	  will	  purchase	  two	  units	  in	  each	  period.	  This	  is	  the	  efficient	  outcome.	  The	  total	  two-­‐period	  surplus	  is	  $60.	  	  
Lock-­‐in	   Contract.	   If	   the	   consumer	   purchased	   from	   Seller	   A	   in	  period	  1,	  the	  seller	  can	  charge	  up	  to	  $120	  in	  period	  2.	  At	  this	  price,	  the	  seller	  will	  sell	  only	  one	  unit,	  and	  will	  earn	  a	  profit	  of	  $20	  (the	  price	  of	  $120	  minus	  the	  cost	  of	  $100).	  Expecting	  this	  $20	  profit,	  in	  period	  1	  the	  seller	  can	  offer	  a	  discount.	  However,	  at	  a	  discounted	  price,	  more	  units	  will	  be	  bought.	  The	  market-­‐clearing,	  period-­‐1	  price	  would	  be	  $93.33.	  At	  this	  price,	  the	  consumer	  buys	  three	  units	  and	  the	  seller	  loses	  exactly	  $20	  (per	  unit	  loss	  of	  $6.67,	  times	  3).	  	  Two	   types	   of	   inefficiency	   arise	   under	   lock-­‐in.	   First,	   when	   the	  price	   is	   high,	   too	   few	   units	   are	   purchased.	   In	   period	   2,	   a	   unit	   that	   is	  valued	   at	   $105	   is	   not	   bought	   because	   the	   price	   is	   $120.	   The	   seller’s	  market	   power	   in	   this	   period	   has	   the	   effect	   of	  monopolistic	   pricing—inefficiently	  reducing	  the	  quantity	  sold.	  Second,	  when	  the	  price	  is	  low,	  
                                                11	  See	  Farrell	  and	  Klemperer,	  supra	  note	  6,	  Sec.	  2.3.2	  (noting	  the	  linear	  pricing	  restriction).	  




too	  many	  units	  are	  purchased.	  In	  period	  1,	  a	  unit	  that	  is	  valued	  at	  $95	  is	  bought	  because	   the	  price	   is	   $93.33.	  The	   seller’s	  below-­‐cost	  pricing	  attracts	  excessive	  purchases.	  12	  	  Lock-­‐in	  reduces	  efficiency,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  harmful	  to	  the	  consumer.	  Under	   the	   No	   Contract	   arrangement,	   the	   consumer’s	   per-­‐period	   net	  payoff	  is	  $30	  –	  she	  gets	  two	  units	  valued	  at	  $230	  (=	  $125	  +	  $105)	  and	  pays	  a	  total	  price	  of	  $200	  –	  for	  a	  two-­‐period	  total	  payoff	  of	  $60.	  Under	  the	   lock-­‐in	  arrangement,	   the	  consumer’s	  period-­‐1	  payoff	   is	  $45	  –	  she	  gets	  three	  units	  valued	  at	  $325	  (=	  $125	  +	  $105	  +	  $95)	  and	  pays	  a	  total	  price	   of	   $280	   (=	  3×$93.33);	   and	  her	   period-­‐2	  payoff	   is	   $5	   –	   she	   gets	  one	  unit	  valued	  at	  $125	  and	  pays	  a	  price	  of	  $120.	  The	  two-­‐period	  total	  net	  payoff	  is	  $50.	  The	  consumer	  loses	  $10,	  or	  16.66%,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  No	  Contract	  alternative.	  	  This	   example	   can	   be	   generalized.	   Instead	   of	   one	   consumer	  seeking	   to	   buy	  multiple	   units,	  we	   can	   introduce	   the	   realism	  of	  many	  heterogeneous	   consumers,	   each	   valuing	   the	   units	   differently.	   Indeed,	  this	   is	   exactly	   what	   our	   example	   captures:	   when	   the	   price	   is	   low	   in	  period	  1,	  we	  march	  down	  the	  demand	  curve	  and	  an	  inefficiently	  large	  quantity	   is	   purchased.	   And	  when	   the	   price	   is	   high	   in	   period	   2,	  many	  consumers	   reduce	   their	   demand	   and	   an	   inefficiently	   low	   quantity	   is	  purchased.	  	  In	  the	  heterogeneous	  demand	  scenario,	  there	  is	  however	  another	  effect—a	   subtle	   and	   often	   unrecognized	   cross-­‐subsidy	   among	  consumers.	  Some	  consumers	  with	  relatively	  low	  valuations	  will	  buy	  in	  period	  1	  and	  then,	  when	  the	  price	  spikes	  up	  in	  period	  2,	  reduce	  their	  demand	  within	   the	   permissible	   contractual	   range,	  without	   triggering	  the	   termination	   penalty.	   These	   consumers	   enjoy	   a	   below-­‐cost	  purchase	   in	   one	   period,	   without	   incurring	   the	   full	   offsetting	  subsequent	   price	   premium.	   Their	   net	   benefit	   must	   be	   paid	   for	   by	  somebody.	   Given	   that	   sellers	   compete	   and	   break	   even,	   the	   cross-­‐subsidy	  must	   come	   from	   other	   consumers.	   These	   are	   the	   high	   value	  consumers	  who	  maintain	   relatively	   high	   demand	   in	   period	   2,	   paying	  the	  high	  prices	  that	  effectively	  fund	  the	  period-­‐1	  discount.	  	  The	   distribution	   of	   consumer	   valuations	   for	   the	   product	   –	   the	  shape	  of	  the	  demand	  curve	  –	  determines	  the	  presence	  and	  size	  of	  the	  
                                                12	  See	  Farrell	  and	  Klemperer,	  supra	  note	  6,	  Section	  2.3.2.	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 quantity	  distortions	  and	  the	  related	  cross-­‐subsidy.	  In	  particular,	  if	  the	  number	   of	   consumers	   in	   the	   low	   valuation	   group	   is	   small,	   then	   they	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  lock-­‐in	  and	  their	  low,	  period-­‐1	  price	  will	  be	  cross	  subsidized	   by	   the	   consumers	   who	   make	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   high-­‐priced	  period-­‐2	   purchases.	   But	   if	   the	   number	   of	   consumers	   with	   low	  valuations	   is	   large,	   then	  the	  seller	  will	  no	   longer	  be	  able	   to	  set	  a	   low,	  period-­‐1	   price,	   because	   there	   will	   not	   be	   enough	   high-­‐valuation	  consumers	   to	   fund	   the	   period-­‐1	   discount	   with	   their	   period-­‐2	  purchases.	  In	  effect,	  the	  demand	  structure	  will	  force	  a	  shift	  to	  a	  pricing	  scheme	  closer	  to	  the	  one	  we	  see	  in	  No	  Contract	  –	  $100	  in	  each	  period	  –	  and	  the	  distortion	  will	  be	  largely	  eliminated.	  Whether	  lock-­‐in	  creates	  a	  distortion	   depends,	   then,	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   enough	   high-­‐valuation	  demand	  from	  which	  period-­‐2	  profits	  can	  be	  reaped.13	  	  Who	  are	  these	  “high	  valuation”	  consumers,	  who	  end	  up	  worse	  off	  under	   lock-­‐in?	   In	   some	   markets—for	   example,	   the	   market	   for	   voice	  and	   data	   services	   for	   smartphones	   and	   tablets	   or	   the	   market	   for	  magazine	  subscriptions—high	  valuation	  is	  associated	  with	  commercial,	  as	  opposed	  to	  private,	  use	  or	  use	  by	  more	  affluent	  consumers.	  In	  these	  markets	  the	  cross	  subsidy	  is	  likely	  progressive.	  In	  other	  markets—for	  example,	   certain	   consumer	   credit	   markets	   –	   high	   valuation	   may	   be	  associated	  with	  more	  urgent	  needs	  and	  absence	  of	  meaningful	  choices,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  cross	  subsidy	  might	  be	  regressive.	  	  
                                                13	  To	  illustrate	  the	  cross-­‐subsidy	  effect,	  consider	  the	  following	  example:	  There	  is	  one	  type-­‐H	  consumer,	  who	  values	  one	  unit	  of	  the	  product	  at	  $125	  (and	  any	  additional	  units	  at	  zero).	  There	  is	  one	  type-­‐L	  consumer,	  who	  values	  one	  unit	  at	  $125	   and	  !! − 1	  units	   at	   $95	   (and	   any	   additional	   units	   at	   zero).	   Can	   	  !! =$120,	   the	   equilibrium	   period-­‐2	   price	   in	   our	   example,	   be	   part	   of	   a	   lock-­‐in	  equilibrium	   in	   this	  more	  general	   set-­‐up?	  Not	   for	   large	  values	  of	  !! .	  A	  seller’s	  period-­‐2	   profit	   with	  !! = $120	  is:	  2 ∙ 120 − 100 = 40.	   The	   period-­‐1	   price	  needs	  to	  offset	   the	  period-­‐2	  profit:	   !! + 1 ∙ 100 − !! = 40.	  For	  !! > 7,	  we	  would	  need	  !! > 95	  to	   solve	   this	  equation.	   Such	  a	  price,	  however,	  would	  not	  be	  an	  equilibrium,	  as	  it	  would	  lead	  type-­‐L	  to	  buy	  only	  a	  single	  unit,	  rather	  than	  !! 	  units.	   Can	   we	   derive	   an	   equilibrium,	   with	  !! = $120,	   where	   the	   type-­‐L	  consumer	   buys	   only	   one	   unit?	   Again,	   the	   answer	   is	   ‘no’.	   In	   that	   case,	   to	  dissipate	   profits	   we	   would	   need:	  2 ∙ 100 − !! = 40	  or	  !! = 80.	   But	   such	   a	  price	   is	   inconsistent	  with	   type-­‐L	   buying	   only	   one	   unit	   (type-­‐L	  would	   buy	  !!	  units	  when	  !! = 80).	  In	  sum,	  there	  is	  no	  equilibrium	  (in	  pure	  strategies)	  with	  !! = $120.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   there	   is	   no	   equilibrium;	   only	   that	   the	  equilibrium	  period-­‐2	  price	  is	  below	  $120.	  The	  solution	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  period-­‐2	  price	  such	  that:	  2 ∙ 100 − !! = 2 ∙ !! − 100 ,	  with	  !! > 95	  (to	  ensure	  that	  type-­‐L	   buys	   only	   a	   single	   unit).	   For	   example,	  !! = $96 ,	  !! = $104 	  is	   an	  equilibrium.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  pricing	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  No	  Contract	  benchmark.	  




The	  quantity	  effects	  of	  lock-­‐in	  are	  quite	  different	  when	  lock-­‐in	  is	  enforced	  with	  loyalty	  rewards	  rather	  than	  with	  termination	  penalties.	  When	  the	  loyalty	  program	  entails	  an	  up	  front	  enrollment	  fee,	  the	  result	  is	   the	  mirror	   image	   of	  what	  we	   found	  with	   termination	   penalties.	   In	  particular,	   one	  break-­‐even	  pricing	   scheme	  entails	   a	   period-­‐1	  price	   of	  $120	  (earning	  the	  seller	  a	  $20	  profit)	  and	  a	   loyalty	  price	  of	  $93.33	   in	  period	  2	  (a	  net	  loss	  to	  the	  seller	  of	  $20).	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  inefficient	  levels	  of	  purchase	  in	  both	  periods.	  However,	  when	  the	  loyalty	  program	  does	   not	   include	   an	   upfront	   fee,	   quantities	   sold	   are	   identical	   to	   the	  quantities	  sold	  under	  No	  Contract.	  Here,	  while	  switching	  is	  effectively	  deterred,	  there	  is	  no	  ex-­‐post	  distortion	  in	  the	  quantity	  purchased	  and	  the	  loyalty	  program	  is,	  in	  that	  respect,	  benign.	  	  2.	  	  Inflexibility	  	  A	  second	  difference	  between	  No	  Contract	  and	  Lock-­‐in,	  which	  was	  displayed	  even	  when	   the	  price	   invariance	  held,	   is	   the	   “loyalty”	  of	   the	  consumer	  to	  one	  seller—the	  absence	  of	  any	  switching	   in	  equilibrium.	  In	   the	   benchmark	   analysis	   this	   was	   inconsequential	   because	   it	   was	  assumed	   that	   per-­‐unit	   production	   costs	   are	   fixed	   at	   $100,	   invariant	  across	  sellers.	  We	  will	  now	  show	  that	  this	  “loyalty”	  feature	  can	  lead	  to	  inefficiency.	   The	   intuition	   is	   the	   following:	   In	   dynamic	   competitive	  markets,	   sellers	  are	  constantly	   improving	   their	  products	  and	  offering	  lower	  cost	  (or	  higher	  value)	  products.	  The	  quality	  and	  cost	  of	  products	  thus	  vary	  over	   time	  and	  across	  sellers.	   “Loyalty,”	  driven	  by	  switching	  costs,	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  that	  consumers	  would	  switch	  to	  a	  better-­‐value,	  innovative	  product.	  We	  label	  this	  the	  “inflexibility”	  distortion.	  	  	  Return	   to	   the	   original	   setup.	   There	   is	   one	   consumer	   and	   two	  sellers.	   Both	   sellers'	   costs	   in	   period	   1	   are	   $100.	   The	   consumer	   is	  demanding	  exactly	  one	  unit	  per	  period,	  which	  provides	  the	  consumer	  a	  value	   of	   $125.	   Now	   assume	   that	   in	   period	   2	   one	   of	   the	   sellers	   will	  introduce	  a	  product	  improvement	  that	  will	  increase	  the	  surplus	  by	  $10.	  The	  improvement	  can	  be	  a	  cost-­‐saving	  technology,	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  producing	   a	   unit	   to	   $90;	   or	   it	   can	   be	   a	   value-­‐enhancing	   technology,	  increasing	   the	   value	   of	   a	   unit	   to	   $135.	   It	   is	   unknown,	   at	   the	   outset,	  which	  of	  the	  two	  sellers	  would	  introduce	  the	  improvement;	  each	  has	  a	  probability	   of	   50%	  of	   becoming	   the	   innovative	   seller.	   In	   this	   setting,	  the	  total	  maximal	  surplus	  is	  $60	  (=	  (125	  –	  100)	  +	  (135	  –	  100)).14	  
                                                14	  Or	  if	  the	  innovation	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  cost-­‐saving	  technology:	  (125	  –	  100)	  +	  (125	  –	  90)	  =	  60.	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No	   Contract.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   consumer	   will	   buy	   the	   improved	  product	  in	  period	  2,	  as	  the	  innovative	  seller	  will	  offer	  a	  slightly	  better	  deal.	  If	  the	  improvement	  is	  a	  cost	  reduction,	  the	  seller	  who	  turns	  out	  to	  have	   lower	   cost	   in	   period	   2	   can	   offer	   a	   small	   discount,	   attract	   the	  consumer,	   and	   enjoy	   a	   profit	   of	   up	   to	   $10.	   If	   the	   improvement	   is	   a	  value	  enhancement,	  the	  seller	  can	  offer	  a	  better	  value	  to	  the	  consumer,	  and	  charge	  up	  to	  $10	  more	  for	  it.	  The	  period-­‐1	  price	  remains	  equal	  to	  the	   period-­‐1	   cost	   of	   $100.	   From	   an	   efficiency	   perspective,	   the	  increased	   surplus	   is	   realized:	   the	   consumer	   always	   buys	   in	   period	   2	  from	   the	   innovative	   seller,	   even	   if	   this	   requires	   switching.	   The	   total	  surplus	  is	  maximal,	  $60.	  The	  consumer	  ends	  up	  with	  a	  $50	  net	  payoff	  and	  the	  seller	  with	  a	  $10	  profit.	  	  	  
Lock-­‐in	   Contract.	   Under	   a	   lock-­‐in	   arrangement	   (with	   a	   $20	  termination	   penalty),	   the	   consumer	   will	   buy	   in	   period	   2	   from	   the	  innovative	   seller	   only	   if	   it	   happens	   to	   be	   the	   same	   seller	   she	   bought	  from	  in	  period	  1.	  Specifically,	   if	  her	  seller	   is	  the	  one	  with	  the	  product	  improvement	  (the	  one	  that	  creates	  a	  surplus	  of	  $35,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  lower	  surplus,	  $25,	  that	  the	  original	  product	  creates)	  there	  is	  no	  price	  that	   the	   lower	   surplus	   seller	   can	   offer	   to	  make	   the	   consumer	   switch	  and	  pay	  the	  switching	  costs.	  Specifically,	   the	   lower-­‐surplus	  seller	  will	  not	  set	  a	  price	  below	  $100,	  and	  so,	   if	   the	  consumer	  switches,	  she	  will	  enjoy	   a	   net	   value	   of	   (at	   most)	   $5	   (=	   125	   –	   100	   –	   20).	   The	   higher-­‐surplus	  seller,	  who	  also	  enjoys	  the	  lock-­‐in	  advantage,	  will	  set	  a	  price	  of	  (just	  below)	  $130	  –	  to	  match	  the	  $5	  net	  value	  ($135	  -­‐	  $130)	  –	  and	  reap	  a	  profit	  of	  $30.	  The	  consumer	  will	  not	  switch.	  	  More	   interesting,	   if	   it	   is	   the	  other	   seller	  who	  offers	   the	  product	  improvement,	   there	   is	   still	   no	   price	   that	   will	   make	   the	   consumer	  switch.	   Suppose,	   for	   example,	   that	   the	   other	   seller	   can	   produce	   the	  product	   for	   only	   $90.	   This	  will	   force	   the	   existing	   seller	   to	   reduce	   its	  period-­‐2	  price	  to	  $110	  (because	  in	  that	  case	  the	  competition	  can	  offer	  $90),	  but	  it	  will	  manage	  to	  keep	  the	  consumer	  from	  switching.	  The	  $10	  improvement	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  overcome	  the	  $20	  switching	  cost.	   	  The	  same	   is	   true	   if	   the	   product	   improvement	   is	   an	   increase	   in	   consumer	  value,	  developed	  by	  the	  other	  seller.	  The	  seller	  with	   the	  new	  product	  can	  offer	  the	  consumer	  a	  maximum	  net	  value,	  accounting	  for	  switching	  costs,	  of	  $15	  (=	  135	  –	  100	  –	  20).	  The	  existing	  seller	  will	  thus	  set	  a	  price	  of	   (just	   below)	   $110,	  which	  would	   provide	   the	   consumer	  with	   a	   net	  value	  of	  (just	  above)	  $15	  (=	  125	  –	  110).	  The	  consumer,	  while	  paying	  a	  lower	  price	  to	  the	  lock-­‐in	  seller,	  will	  not	  buy	  the	  higher	  value	  product	  –	  an	  inefficient	  outcome.	  	  




Nothing	  changes	  in	  period	  1.	  Before	  it	  is	  known	  who	  will	  be	  the	  innovative	   seller,	   each	   seller	   expects	   that,	   if	   it	   gets	   the	   locked-­‐in	  consumer	  in	  period	  1,	  it	  will	  earn	  a	  period-­‐2	  profit	  of	  either	  $30	  (if	  it	  is	  the	  innovative	  seller)	  or	  $10	  (if	  it	  is	  not),	  each	  with	  equal	  probability—for	  an	  expected	  profit	  of	  $20.	  Anticipating	  this,	  in	  period	  1	  each	  seller	  will	  offer	  a	  below-­‐cost	  price	  of	  $80.	  	  As	   before,	   there	   is	   no	   switching.	   The	   consumer	   does	   enjoy	  increased	  surplus	  due	  to	  cost	  reduction	  (a	  50%	  chance	  that	  the	  period-­‐2	  net	  payoff	  will	  be	  $15,	  rather	  than	  the	  originally	  anticipated	  $5).	  The	  total	  expected	  net	  consumer	  payoff	  is	  therefore	  $45	  +	  ½$5	  	  +	  ½$15	  =	  $55.	   As	   compared	   to	   No	   Contract,	   the	   consumer	   is	   better	   off	   by	   $5	  under	   the	   lock-­‐in	  contract!	  The	  expected	  profit	   for	   the	  seller	  remains	  $0,	   due	   to	   competition.	   The	   only	   difference	   is	   that	   we	   now	   have	   a	  stochastic	  profit—in	  period	  2	  the	  profit	  will	  be	  either	  $10	  or	  $30,	   for	  an	  expected	  profit	  of	  $20—which	  will	  be	  offset	  by	  the	  $20	  discount	  in	  period	  1.	  	  	  While	   consumers	   benefit	   from	   lock-­‐in,	   it	   is	   inefficient.	   The	  inefficiency	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	   forgone	   improvement	   in	   period	   2:	  there	  is	  a	  50%	  chance	  that	  the	  consumer	  would	  not	  purchase	  from	  the	  innovative	   seller	   in	  period	  2	  and	   remain	   locked-­‐into	   the	  unimproved	  product.	   Overall	   surplus	   under	   lock-­‐in	   is	   $55,	   whereas	   the	   optimal	  outcome	  allows	  for	  a	  surplus	  of	  $60.	  	  In	   sum,	   relative	   to	   No	   Contract,	   lock-­‐in	   creates	   inefficiency	  (overall	   surplus	   is	   $55,	   rather	   than	   $60),	   but	   also	   increases	   the	  consumer	   surplus	   (from	   $50	   to	   $55).	   The	   reason	   is	   that	   the	   seller’s	  period-­‐2	  profits	  from	  lock-­‐in	  are	  competed	  away	  in	  period	  1.	  With	  No	  Contract,	   the	   seller	   with	   the	   new	   product	   makes	   supra-­‐competitive	  profits	  in	  period	  2,	  but	  these	  profits	  are	  not	  competed	  away	  in	  period	  1.	  	  A	   similar	   efficiency	   cost	   is	   incurred	   when	   lock-­‐in	   is	   enforced	  using	   loyalty	   programs.	   Consumers	   choose	   to	   remain	   loyal	   to	   their	  seller,	  even	  if	  in	  a	  world	  without	  such	  programs	  they	  would	  switch	  to	  the	   superior	   match.	   Think	   of	   a	   consumer	   who	   books	   a	   flight	   with	  United	   Airlines,	   just	   to	   maintain	   her	   “elite”	   frequent-­‐flyer	   status,	  notwithstanding	   the	   better	   fare	   or	   flight	   itinerary	   on	   Southwest	  Airlines.	   Note	   that	   loyalty	   programs	   impose	   an	   inflexibility	   cost	  regardless	   of	  whether	   the	  program	   charges	   an	  up	   front	   participation	  fee	  or	  not.	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  3.	  	  Entry	  Deterrence	  	  Another	  implication	  of	  the	  inflexibility	  effect	  is	  entry	  deterrence.	  Lock-­‐in	  contracts	  dampen	  competition	  by	  deterring	  entry	  of	  potential	  competitors	  into	  the	  market.	  By	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  consumers	  to	   switch	   to	   a	   new	   entrant,	   lock-­‐in	   contracts	   render	   entry	   less	  profitable.	  As	  a	   result,	   lock-­‐in	  helps	   sustain	  oligopolistic	  markets	  and	  deprives	  consumers	  of	  the	  benefits	  from	  more	  intense	  competition.15	  	  The	   basic	   model	   assumed	   that	   both	   sellers	   are	   already	   in	   the	  market	   in	   period	   1,	   and	   that	   consumers	   enjoyed	   the	   full	   benefits	   of	  competition	   that	   drove	   prices	   down	   to	   marginal	   cost.	   Alternatively,	  assume	  that	  only	  Seller	  A	  is	  in	  the	  market	  in	  period	  1.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  consumer	  always	  buys	  from	  Seller	  A	  in	  period	  1,	  and	  that	  the	  price	  may	  exceed	  marginal	  cost.	  In	  period	  2,	  Seller	  B	  is	  considering	  whether	  to	   enter	   the	  market	   and	   compete	  with	   Seller	   A.	   To	   simplify	  matters,	  assume	  that	  Seller	  B	  would	  enter	  the	  market	  only	   if	   it	  has	  a	  non-­‐zero	  chance	  of	  attracting	  the	  single	  consumer.	  	  	  
No	  Contract.	  With	   No	   Contract,	   if	   seller	   B	   enters	   the	  market	   in	  period	   2,	   competition	   will	   force	   both	   sellers	   to	   set	   a	   price	   of	   $100,	  equal	   to	   their	   marginal	   cost.	   Since	   both	   sellers	   offer	   an	   identical	  product	  at	  an	  identical	  price,	  the	  consumer	  will	  randomly	  select	  one	  of	  the	   sellers.	   Anticipating	   a	   50%	   chance	   of	   being	   chosen,	   seller	   B	   will	  enter	  the	  market.	  	  
Lock-­‐in	  Contract.	  The	  outcome	  with	   lock-­‐in	   is	  different.	  The	  $20	  exit	  penalty	   in	  the	  lock-­‐in	  contract	  would	  prevent	  the	  consumer	  from	  switching	   to	   Seller	   B.	   Seller	   A	   will	   set	   a	   price	   slightly	   below	   the	  minimum	   price	   that	   Seller	   B	   can	   set,	   $100,	   plus	   the	   termination	   fee	  (say,	   a	   price	   of	   $119).	   Anticipating	   this,	   Seller	   B	   will	   not	   enter	   the	  market.	   Rather	   than	   paying	   $100	   in	   period	   2,	   the	   consumer	  will	   pay	  (almost)	  $120.	  Moreover,	  unlike	  in	  the	  basic	  model,	  the	  high	  period-­‐2	  price	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  lower	  period-­‐1	  price.	  	  Entry	   deterrence	   has	   a	   distributive	   effect,	   of	   increasing	   the	  incumbent	   seller’s	   profits	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   consumers.	   It	   may	   also	  cause	   inefficiency	   by	   deterring	   entry	   of	   more	   efficient	   sellers.	   These	  effects	   have	   been	   widely	   recognized	   in	   the	   airline	   industry,	   for	  example.	   Frequent-­‐flyer	   programs,	   the	   airline	   version	   of	   loyalty	  programs,	  help	  the	   incumbent	  airline	  dominate	  key	  hub	  airports	  and,	  
                                                15	  See	  Farrell	  and	  Klemperer,	  supra	  note	  6,	  Section	  2.7.	  




with	   this	   hub	   dominance,	   deter	   entry	   by	   potentially	   more	   efficient	  airlines	   (not	   to	   mention	   the	   cost	   of	   high	   airfares	   charged	   by	   the	  dominant	  airline).16	  	  
D.	  	  Imperfectly	  Rational	  Consumers	  	  	  Many	   consumers	   fall	   short	   of	   the	   perfect	   rationality	   ideal	  assumed	  in	  the	  analysis	  so	  far.	  What	  are	  the	  social	  welfare	  implications	  of	   No	   Contract,	   as	   compared	   to	   lock-­‐in,	   when	   consumers	   are	  imperfectly	  rational?	  	  	  The	  main	   concern	  about	   lock-­‐in	   is	   that	  many	   consumers	  would	  not	   fully	   appreciate	   the	   period-­‐2	   effect—increased	   prices	   and	   a	  penalty	   for	   exit—and	   that	   this	   myopia	   would	   lead	   consumers	   to	  engage	   in	   excessive	   consumption	   in	   period	   1.	   The	   distortions	   might	  then	  come	  from	  two	  directions.	  First,	  consumers	  might	  be	   trapped	   in	  relationships	   that	   they	   would	   otherwise	   prefer	   to	   exit.	   And,	   second,	  consumers	  might	  enter	  into	  inefficient	  deals	  by	  the	  lure	  of	  low	  upfront	  prices.	   While	   the	   first	   distortion	   merely	   exacerbates	   problems	   with	  lock-­‐in	   that	   occur	   even	   when	   consumers	   are	   rational—namely,	   the	  inflexibility	  effect,	  which	  limits	  ability	  to	  capture	  new	  opportunities	  for	  better	  deals—the	   second	  distortion	   is	   unique	   to	   the	   irrational	   choice	  setting.17	  	  We	   can	   identify	   at	   least	   three	   distinct	   misperceptions	   that	  consumers	   might	   have.	   First,	   consumers	   might	   underestimate	   the	  switching	   costs,	   whether	   these	   are	   contractual	   penalties	   (the	   early	  termination	  fee)	  or	  real	  switching	  costs	  (e.g.,	  changing	  one’s	  cellphone	  
                                                16	  Robert	   D.	   Cairns	   and	   John	   Galbraith,	   Artificial	   Compatibility,	   Barriers	   to	  Entry,	   and	  Frequent	   Flyer	  Programs,	   23	  Canadian	   J.	   Econ.	   807	   (1990);	  Mara	  Lederman,	   Are	   Frequent	   Flyer	   Programs	   a	   Cause	   of	   the	  Hub	   Premium,	   17	   J.	  Econ.	  &	  Management	  Strategy	  35	   (2008).	  But	   see	  Ramon	  Caminal	  and	  Adina	  Claici,	   Are	   loyalty-­‐rewarding	   pricing	   schemes	   anti-­‐competitive?,	   25	   Int’l	   J.	   of	  Indus.	  Org.	  657	  (2007).	  17	  We	  focus	  on	  the	  risk	  that	  consumers	  might	  underestimate	  the	  cost	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  There	  is	  another,	  related	  risk	  –	  that	  consumers	  would	  overestimate	  the	  benefit	  of	   No	   Contract.	  While	   No	   Contract	   eliminated	   contractual	   switching	   costs,	   it	  does	   not	   eliminate	   other	   non-­‐contractual	   (real)	   switching	   costs.	   The	   risk	   is	  that	  consumers,	  lured	  by	  Sellers’	  No	  Contract	  pitch,	  would	  enter	  into	  welfare-­‐reducing	   transactions.	   Cf.	   Shmuel	   I.	   Becher	   and	   Tal	   Z.	   Zarsky,	   Open	   Doors,	  Trap	   Doors,	   and	   the	   Law,	   74	   Law	   and	   Contemporary	   Problems	   63	   (2011).	  [Perhaps	  this	  deserves	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  treatment	  in	  the	  text.]	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 number).	   Contractual	   penalties	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   underestimated	  because	  they	  are	  buried	  in	  the	  fine	  print	  that	  consumers	  do	  not	  read.18	  And	  real	  switching	  costs	  are	  underestimated	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  experience	  and	  naïveté.	  Second,	  consumers	  might	  fail	   to	  anticipate	  the	  escalating	  prices	   associated	  with	   lock-­‐in	   contracts,	   especially	  when	   the	   price	   is	  broken	   down	   into	   a	   complex,	   multi-­‐factor	   formula	   that	   includes	  numerous	  itemized	  fees,	  some	  of	  which	  depend	  on	  the	  consumer’s	  yet	  unknown	   use-­‐patterns.	   Also,	   the	   contract	   term	   that	   defines	   exactly	  when	   period	   1	   ends	   and	   period	   2	   begins	   is	   often	   non-­‐salient	   to	  consumers	  and	  rarely	  highlighted	  by	  sellers	  prior	  to	  the	  first	  escalated	  bill	   in	   period	   2	   (hence	   the	   colloquial	   term	   “bill	   shock”).19	  	   Third,	  consumers	  might	  underestimate	  their	  potential	  period-­‐2	  opportunities.	  Greater	   benefits	   might	   be	   captured	   in	   period	   2	   by	   switching	   to	  products	   and	   technologies	   that,	   at	   period	   1,	   do	   not	   yet	   exist.	   If	  consumers	   underestimate	   the	   pace	   of	   change	   in	   technology,	   cost	   or	  their	   own	  preferences,	   they	  will	   underestimate	   the	  benefits	   from	   the	  option	  to	  switch	  and,	  correspondingly,	  the	  effective	  cost	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  these	  mistakes	  might	  not	  hurt	  consumers,	  relative	  to	   the	   perfect	   rationality	   benchmark.	   Take	   our	   initial	   example	   of	   a	  product	  that	  costs	  $100	  to	  produce,	  where	  the	  price	  rose	  from	  $80	  to	  $120	   due	   to	   a	   lock-­‐in	   penalty	   of	   $20.	   Consumers	   experience	   a	   large	  decline	   in	   net	   payoff	   at	   period	   2,	   but	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  might	   fail	   to	  anticipate	   this	   pattern	   does	   not	   necessarily	   change	   their	   conduct	   or	  choices.	  They	  might	  be	  upset	  or	  disappointed,	  but	  they	  would	  not	  have	  behaved	  differently,	  and	  they	  are	  not	  hurt	  by	  their	  limited	  cognition.	  	  In	   other	   cases,	   consumers’	   irrational	   expectations	   might	   lower	  their	  payoff	  relative	  to	  the	  perfect	  rationality	  outcome,	  and	  might	  also	  lead	   to	   inefficient	   trade,	   in	  which	  consumers	  enter	   contracts	   that	  are	  overall	   welfare	   reducing.	   To	   illustrate,	   assume	   that	   a	   consumer	   is	  unaware	  of	   the	  $20	   lock-­‐in	  penalty,	  mistakenly	  believing	  that	   it	   is	  $0.	  The	  consumer	  would	  thus	  fail	  to	  anticipate	  the	  period-­‐2	  price	  increase.	  
                                                18	  See,	   e.g.,	   Yannis	   Bakos,	   Florencia	   Marotta-­‐Wurgler	   and	   David	   R.	   Trossen,	  Does	  Anyone	  Read	  the	  Fine	  Print?	  Testing	  a	  Law	  and	  Economics	  Approach	  to	  Standard	  Form	  Contracts,	  NYU	  Law	  and	  Economics	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  09-­‐40	  (2009)	  (available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256).	  19	  The	   FTC	   found	   that	   30	  million	   Americans	   -­‐-­‐	   or	   one	   in	   six	  mobile	   users	   -­‐-­‐	  have	  experienced	   “bill	   shock,”	   a	   sudden	   increase	   in	   their	  monthly	  bill	   that	   is	  not	   caused	   by	   a	   change	   in	   service	   plan.	   Nearly	   half	   of	   cell	   phone	   users	   and	  almost	  two	  thirds	  of	  broadband	  users	  with	  early	  termination	  fees	  don’t	  know	  the	   amount	   of	   the	   fees	   they	   are	   accountable	   for.	   See	   News	   Release,	   FCC	  SURVEY	   CONFIRMS	   CONSUMERS	   EXPERIENCE	   MOBILE	   BILL	   SHOCK	   AND	  CONFUSION	  ABOUT	  EARLY	  TERMINATION	  FEES,	  May	  26,	  2010.	  




Assume	   now	   that,	   due	   to	   the	   period-­‐2	   price	   increase,	   the	   consumer	  would	  have	  a	  negative	  period-­‐2	  payoff,	  something	  that	  a	  rational	  actor	  would	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  (and	  take	  into	  account	  in	  period	  1),	  but	  which	  an	  irrational	  consumer	  fails	  to	  anticipate.	  Specifically,	  assume	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  product	  to	  the	  consumer	  is	  only	  $95.	  The	  sellers	  will	  set	  a	  price	  of	  $80	  at	  period	  1	  and	  a	  price	  exceeding	  $115	  in	  period	  2.20	  The	  naïve	   consumer	   will	   make	   the	   purchase	   in	   period	   1	   but	   will	   exit	   in	  period	  2.	  He	  will	  net	  $15	  in	  period	  1,	  but	  will	  lose	  the	  $20	  termination	  penalty	  in	  period	  2.	  His	  overall	  welfare	  will	  be	  -­‐$5.	  The	  private	  loss	  is	  also	   a	   social	   loss—it	   is	   due	   to	   an	   inefficient	   period-­‐1	   purchase,	   in	  which	  a	  product	  that	  is	  worth	  only	  $95	  is	  produced	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $100.21	  	  In	  this	  illustration,	  the	  consumer	  actually	  exited	  in	  period	  2	  and	  paid	   the	   termination	   penalty.	   A	   different	   type	   of	   inefficient	   outcome	  occurs	  when	  the	  consumer	  remains	  locked-­‐in	  in	  period	  2,	  forfeiting	  the	  opportunity	  to	  switch	  to	  a	  different,	  more	  efficient,	  seller.	  We	  already	  saw	   that	   even	   if	   consumers	   are	  perfectly	   rational,	   they	  might	   end	  up	  inefficiently	   locked	   into	   low	   value	   purchases.	   For	   example,	   when	   an	  opportunity	  to	  switch	  to	  a	  higher-­‐surplus	  seller	  arises	  stochastically,	  it	  might	  be	  squandered	  if	  the	  gain	  from	  switching	  is	  less	  than	  the	  lock-­‐in	  penalty.	   This	   inflexibility	   effect	   is	   compounded	   in	   two	   ways	   when	  consumers	  suffer	  from	  irrational	  expectations.	  First,	  it	  may	  arise	  even	  in	  non-­‐stochastic	  environments,	  for	  example	  when	  consumers	  enter	  a	  contract	  with	  Seller	  A	  failing	  to	  recognize	  that	  Seller	  B	  will	  introduce	  a	  better	   product	   in	   period	   2.	   Second,	   irrational	   consumers	   may	   enter	  inefficient	  period-­‐1	  contracts	  and	  remain	  locked	  in.	  	  	  In	   all,	  when	   the	   cost	   of	   lock-­‐in	   is	   underestimated,	   the	   cost	   of	   a	  product	   or	   service	   that	   is	   accompanied	   by	   a	   lock-­‐in	   contract	   will	   be	  underestimated.	  Demand	  for	  these	  products	  and	  services	  will	   thus	  be	  artificially	   inflated:	   Consumers	   will	   purchase	   products	   and	   services	  
                                                20	  A	  period-­‐2	  price	   exceeding	   $115	  would	   induce	   consumers	   to	   exit	   and	  pay	  the	  $20	  penalty,	  because	  purchasing	  at	  this	  price	  would	  involve	  a	  loss	  greater	  than	  $20.	  The	  seller	  would	  thus	  earn	  the	  termination	  penalty	  of	  $20.	  A	  period-­‐2	  price	  of	  $115	  or	   lower	  would	   induce	  consumers	  to	  make	  the	  purchase,	  but	  the	  seller’s	  net	  payoff	  will	  be,	  at	  most,	  $15.	  21	  The	   same	   analysis	   applies	   if	   consumers	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   $20	   termination	  penalty	  but	  fail	  to	  recognize	  that	  sellers	  would	  exploit	  it	  to	  raise	  the	  period-­‐2	  price.	   Believing	   that	   the	   price	   will	   remain	   $80	   in	   period	   2,	   the	   consumer	  makes	  the	  period-­‐1	  purchase	  but	  then	  exits	  in	  period	  2.	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 that	   they	   shouldn’t.22	  One	   manifestation	   of	   this	   bias	   is	   the	   excessive	  allure	  of	  upfront	  perks	   that	   consumers	  accept,	   in	   return	   for	  a	   lock-­‐in	  arrangement.	   Free	   gifts,	   high-­‐end	   phones,	   and	   various	   other	   teasers	  are	   used	   to	   “seduce”	   consumers,	   but	   often	   these	   are	   consumption	  artifacts	  that	  rational	  consumers	  would	  choose	  to	  forgo,	  if	  they	  had	  to	  bear	  their	   true	  cost	  or	  price.	  Many	  consumers	  would	  hold	  on	  to	  their	  used	   smartphones	   longer,	   rather	   than	   upgrade	   them	   to	   a	  marginally	  improved	  device,	  if	  not	  for	  the	  opportunity	  to	  receive	  a	  “free”	  upgrade	  every	  time	  they	  renew	  a	  lock-­‐in	  arrangement	  with	  their	  provider.	  	  	  Lock-­‐in	  is	  a	  rational	  response	  by	  profit-­‐maximizing	  sellers	  to	  the	  imperfect	  rationality	  of	  their	  customers.	  With	  No	  Contract	  consumers	  enjoy	   intermediate	   payoffs	   in	   both	   periods.	   With	   lock-­‐in	   consumers	  enjoy	   high	   payoffs	   in	   period	   1	   and	   low	   payoffs	   in	   period	   2.	   Rational	  consumers	   anticipate	   the	   declining	   payoffs	   under	   lock-­‐in	   and,	  consequently,	  exhibit	  no	  preference	  for	  Lock-­‐in	  over	  No	  Contract:	  High	  payoffs	   in	   period	   1	   followed	   by	   low	   payoffs	   in	   period	   2	   is	   no	   better	  than	   intermediate	   payoffs	   in	   both	   periods.	   Imperfectly	   rational	  consumers	  might	   fail	   to	   appreciate	   the	   declining	   payoffs	   that	   lock-­‐in	  implies.	  Products	  accompanied	  by	  lock-­‐in	  contracts	  would	  thus	  appear	  to	   be	  more	   attractive:	  High	  payoffs	   in	   period	  1	   followed	  by	   similarly	  high	   payoffs	   (or	   intermediate	   payoffs)	   in	   period	   2	   are	   better	   than	  intermediate	  payoffs	   in	  both	  periods.	  A	  seller	  who	  offers	  No	  Contract	  would	  thus	  lose	  business	  to	  a	  seller	  who	  offers	  a	  Lock-­‐in	  Contract.23	  	  	  These	   adverse	   implications	   of	   imperfect	   rationality	   apply	   also	  when	   lock-­‐in	   is	   enforced	   using	   loyalty	   programs,	   rather	   than	  termination	  penalties.	  Reconsider	  the	  three	  misperceptions	   identified	  above:	  The	  first	  –	  underestimation	  of	  switching	  costs	  –	  applies	  equally	  to	   loyalty	   programs,	   as	   does	   the	   third	   misperception	   –	  underestimation	   of	   potential	   period	   2	   opportunities.	   The	   second	   –	  failure	  to	  anticipate	  escalating	  prices	  –	  also	  applies,	  at	   least	  when	  the	  loyalty	  program	  does	  not	  impose	  an	  upfront	  fee.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  effective	  price,	  under	  such	  programs,	  would	  remain	  unchanged	  across	  the	  two	  periods,	  with	  the	  nominal	  period-­‐2	  price	  rising	  by	  the	  value	  of	  the	  reward.	  At	  period-­‐2,	  the	  consumer	  might	  recognize	  this	  tradeoff.	  At	  period	  1,	  however,	  the	  same	  consumer	  might	  overestimate	  the	  value	  of	  the	   loyalty	   reward,	   since	   sellers	   spend	   much	   promotional	   effort	  highlighting	   the	   loyalty	   perks,	   but	   not	   the	   accompanying	   price	  increases.	  The	  consumers	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  overpay	  even	  in	  period	  1	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  perceived	  reward.	  Finally,	  loyalty	  programs	  entail	  a	  
                                                22	  See	  BAR-­‐GILL,	  supra	  note	  2,	  ch.	  1.	  23	  See	  BAR-­‐GILL,	  supra	  note	  2.	  




fourth	  misperception	  that	  is	  not	  present	  when	  lock-­‐in	  is	  enforced	  with	  a	   termination	   penalty.	   Loyalty	   rewards	   often	   come	  with	   a	   wealth	   of	  fine-­‐print	   restrictions:	   Think	   black-­‐out	   dates	   in	   airline	   frequent-­‐flyer	  programs	  or	  expiration	  dates	  on	  reward	  vouchers.	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  consumers	   will	   underestimate	   the	   burdens	   imposed	   by	   these	  restrictions	   and	   thus	   overestimate	   the	   value	   of	   the	   loyalty	   rewards.	  This	   misperception	   further	   reduces	   the	   likelihood	   of	   efficient	  switching.	   Even	   if	   a	   new	   seller	   offers	   a	   deal	   that	   is	   sufficiently	  attractive	   that	   it	   outweighs	   the	   actual	   value	   of	   the	   loyalty	   reward,	   it	  might	   not	   outweigh	   the	   overestimated	   value	   of	   the	   same	   loyalty	  reward.	  	  
E.	  	  Investment	  Efficiency	  	  The	  value	  of	  a	  product	  or	  service	  is	  determined,	  in	  large	  part,	  by	  investments	   that	   the	   seller	   makes	   in	   improving	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  product	   or	   service.	   Cable	   companies	   can	   increase	   the	   value	   of	   their	  service	  by	  investing	  in	  better,	  more	  varied	  content,	  or	  in	  installation	  of	  broad	   band	   infrastructure.	   Cellphone	   companies	   can	   improve	   the	  quality	  of	  service	  by	   investing	   in	  a	  better	  network	  and	  building	  more	  towers.	  Satelite	  TV	  can	  install	  more	  powerful	  dishes.	  And	  health	  clubs	  can	   invest	   in	   new	   equipment.	   	   The	   question	  we	   now	   ask	   is	  whether	  contractual	  design	  –	  No	  Contract	  vs.	  Lock-­‐in	  –	  affects	  the	  incentives	  to	  make	  such	  investments.	  	  A	   basic,	   intuitive	   conjecture	   may	   go	   as	   follows:	   Lock-­‐in	  guarantees	  sellers	  a	  longer	  duration	  contract	  and	  greater	  returns	  from	  their	   investments.	   As	   long	   as	   sellers	   enjoy	   some	   per-­‐period	   profit—that	  is,	  as	  long	  as	  competition	  does	  not	  dissipate	  all	  the	  profits—lock-­‐in	   will	   be	   associated	   with	   greater	   returns	   for	   investment	   and,	  accordingly,	  sellers	  will	  invest	  more.	  	  	  Our	   analysis	   below	   will	   show	   that	   this	   conjecture	   is	   false.	   It	  overlooks	   a	   more	   subtle	   effect:	   under	   No	   Contract,	   despite	   the	  potentially	   short	   duration	  of	   the	   relationship,	   a	   seller	  would	  have	   an	  additional	   incentive	   to	   invest	   –	   to	   keep	   the	   consumer	   in	   the	  relationship.	  Instead	  of	  depending	  on	  its	  clients’	  no-­‐exit	  obligation,	  the	  seller	  will	  have	  to	  improve	  the	  product’s	  value	  to	  convince	  the	  clients	  to	  stay.	  	  
 26	   Bar-­‐Gill	  &	  Ben-­‐Shahar	   [February	  16	  
 To	  appreciate	  the	  generality	  of	  this	  observation,	  we	  will	  present	  the	   analysis	  more	   formally.	   Consider	   a	   two	  period	   setting	   in	  which	   a	  single	  seller	  and	  a	  single	  buyer	  transact	  over	  a	  single	  unit	  of	  a	  product.	  The	  per-­‐period	   value	   of	   the	  product	   to	   the	   consumer	   is	  v,	   and	   it	   is	   a	  function	   of	   the	   seller’s	   investment,	   x,	   namely	  ! = !(!).	   	   The	   contract	  between	  the	  parties	  has	  two	  aspects.	  First,	  it	  divides	  the	  surplus,	  !(!),	  between	  the	  parties,	  with	  a	  fraction	  !	  secured	  by	  the	  seller	  and	  1-­‐  !	  by	  the	  consumer.24	  Namely,	  the	  seller	  can	  charge	  a	  per-­‐period	  price	  of	  !"	  (assume	   that	   the	   seller’s	  per-­‐unit	   cost	   is	   zero).25	  Second,	   the	   contract	  determines	   the	   duration,	   1	   or	   2	   periods.	   A	   1-­‐period	   contract	  corresponds	   to	   a	   “No	   Contract”	   arrangement,	   whereas	   a	   2-­‐period	  contract	   is	   a	   “Lock-­‐in.”	   We	   assume	   risk-­‐neutrality,	   zero	   discounting,	  and	  perfect	  information.	  	  The	   intuitive	   conjecture	   stated	   above	   builds	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   if	  the	   transaction	   is	   a	   one-­‐period	   transaction,	   the	   seller’s	   revenue	   is	  !" ! ;	   and	   if	   it	   is	   a	   two-­‐period	   transaction,	   the	   seller’s	   revenue	   is	  2!" ! .	   The	   marginal	   increase	   in	   revenue	   from	   a	   $1	   investment	   in	  value	  is	  twice	  as	  large	  if	  the	  transaction	  lasts	  two	  periods,	  as	  compared	  to	   only	   one	   period	   (2!"′ ! 	  as	   compared	   to	  !"′ ! ).	   Accordingly,	   as	  long	  as	   investment	  yields	  positive	  but	  decreasing	  marginal	   returns,	   a	  profit-­‐maximizing	  seller	  will	  invest	  more	  in	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  its	  product,	   if	   it	   expects	   the	   consumer	   to	   stay	   for	   a	   longer	   period.	   This	  basic	   insight	   –	   that	   longer	   seller-­‐buyer	   relationships	   lead	   to	   higher	  investment	   (and	   thus	  better	  product	  value)	  –	  would	  seem	   to	  provide	  an	  argument	  for	  lock-­‐in.	  Let	  us	  now	  examine	  this	  more	  closely.	  	  
No	  Contract.	  Let	  p	  denote	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  consumer	  will	  stay	  on	  for	  the	  second	  period.	  This	  probability	  may	  depend	  on	  various	  factors	  not	  captured	  in	  the	  model	  (e.g.,	  outside	  options),	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  function	   of	   the	   per-­‐period	   value	   of	   the	   product	   to	   the	   consumer:	  ! = !(!).	   And	   the	   value	   of	   the	   product	   is	   a	   function	   of	   the	   seller’s	  investment	   in	   quality:	   ! = !(!) .	   Hence:	   ! = ! !(!) .	   Under	   No	  Contract,	  the	  seller’s	  profits	  are:	  	  	   !" ! + ! !(!) ∙ !" ! − !	  or	  
                                                24	  We	  assume	  that	  the	  fraction	  each	  party	  secures	  is	  exogenously	  fixed.	  25	  To	  keep	  things	  simple,	  we	  assume	  –	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  simple	  model	  –	  that	  the	  per-­‐period	  price	  is	  the	  same	  in	  both	  periods,	  under	  both	  No	  Contract	  and	  lock-­‐in.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  lock-­‐in	  (where	  the	  priod-­‐1	  price	   is	   low	  and	  the	  priod-­‐2	  price	   is	  high).	  But	  our	  simplifying	  assumption	   is	  innocuous	   here,	   because,	   for	   investment	   purposes,	   sellers	   care	   about	   total	  price,	  not	  about	  the	  per-­‐period	  price.	  




	   !" ! ∙ 1 + ! !(!) − !	  	  The	   investment	   level	   that	   maximizes	   profits	   satisfies	   the	   first-­‐order	  condition	  (FOC):	  	  	  !!!(!) ∙ 1 + ! ! ! + !" ! ∙ !" !(!) !" ∙ !!(!) = 1	  	  or	  	   !!!(!) ∙ 1 + ! ! ! + ! ! ∙ !" !(!) !" = 1	  	  The	  FOC	  captures	   three	  distinct	  effects	   that	  determine	   the	   level	  of	  investment:	  	  	  (i) Higher	  price.	  The	  first	  expression	  on	  the	  Left-­‐Hand	  Side	  (LHS)	  of	  the	   FOC,	  !!!(!),	  reflects	   the	   per-­‐period	   increase	   in	   the	   surplus	  that	   the	   investing	   seller	   can	   capture.	   Higher	   investment	  increases	   the	   total	   surplus,	  ! ! ,	   and	   the	   seller	   sets	   a	   higher	  price	  to	  capture	  the	  same	  share,	  !,	  of	  this	  larger	  surplus.	  	  	  (ii) Duration	  multiplier.	   	  The	   second	   expression	   on	   the	   LHS	   of	   the	  FOC,	   1 + ! ! ! ,	  reflects	   the	   expected	   number	   of	   periods	   in	  which	  the	  investment	  will	  bear	  fruit.	  Since	  the	  consumer	  buys	  in	  the	  first	  period	  for	  sure	  (probability	  1)	  and	  in	  the	  second	  period	  with	   probability	  ! ! ! ,	   the	   “higher	   price”	   effect	   is	   multiplied	  by	  a	  factor	  greater	  than	  1.	  The	  higher	  ! ! ! 	  is,	  the	  greater	  the	  return	  to	  investment,	  which	  translates	  into	  higher	  profits	  for	  the	  investing	  seller.	  	  	  (iii) Keeping	  customers	  happy.	  The	  third	  expression	  on	  the	  LHS	  of	  the	  FOC,	   ! ! ∙ !" !(!) !" , 	  reflects	   a	   bonding	   effect	   of	  investment:	   investing	  more	   increases	  v,	  which	   in	   turn	   increases	  the	   probability	   that	   the	   consumer	   will	   be	   sufficiently	   satisfied	  with	  the	  product	  that	  he	  will	  choose	  to	  buy	  in	  the	  second	  period,	  despite	  the	  “No	  Contract”	  option	  to	  exit.	  By	  choosing	  No	  Contract,	  the	   seller	   effectively	   commits	   to	   invest	   in	  making	   its	   customers	  happy.	  	  
Lock-­‐in	   Contract.	   Consider,	   in	   contrast,	   the	   seller’s	   incentive	   to	  invest	   under	   lock-­‐in.	   Since	   lock-­‐in	   guarantees	   that	   the	   consumer	  will	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 purchase	   the	   product	   in	   both	   periods,	   the	   seller’s	   profits	   are:	  !" ! ∙ 2 − !.	  And	  the	  first-­‐order	  condition	  (FOC)	  is:	  	  	   !!!(!) ∙ 2 = 1	  	  The	   FOC	   here	   captures	   two	   effects	   that	   determine	   the	   level	   of	  investment:	  	  	  (i) Higher	  price.	  The	  first	  expression	  on	  the	  LHS	  of	  the	  FOC,	  !!!(!),	  reflects	   again	   the	   per-­‐period	   increase	   in	   the	   surplus	   that	   the	  investing	  seller	  can	  capture.	  	  	  (ii) Duration	  multiplier.	   	  Because	   the	   seller	   is	  guaranteed	  purchases	  over	  two	  periods,	  the	  multiplier	  is	  2.	  	  	  We	   can	   now	   compare	   the	   investment	   incentives	   under	   No	  Contract	  and	  Lock-­‐in.	  	  	  (i) Higher	  price.	  This	  effect,	  !!!(!),	  which	  is	  the	  per-­‐period	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  the	  seller	  can	  charge,	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  transaction	  and	  is	  thus	  identical	  under	  both	  regimes.	  	  (ii) Duration	  multiplier.	  Since	  1 + ! ! ! < 2,	   this	   effect	   is	   greater	  under	   the	   lock-­‐in	   regime.	   The	   guaranteed	   second-­‐period	   profit	  under	   lock-­‐in	   is	   a	   greater	   booster	   to	   investment	   than	   the	  uncertain,	  probabilistic	  second-­‐period	  profit	  under	  No	  Contract.	  This	   is	   the	   effect	   that	   underlies	   the	   intuitive	   conjecture	  mentioned	   above,	   whereby	   long-­‐term	   relationships	   are	   more	  conducive	  to	  investment.	  
	  (iii) Keeping	   Customers	   Happy.	   This	   effect	   exists	   only	   under	   a	   No	  Contract	  regime.	  Under	  lock-­‐in,	  the	  seller	  does	  not	  have	  to	  invest	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  consumer	  –	  the	  contract	  secures	  the	  period-­‐2	   purchase.	   Under	   No	   Contract,	   by	   contrast,	   the	   seller	   who	  invests	   more	   increases	   the	   likelihood	   that	   the	   consumer	   will	  stick	  around	  and	  will	  generate	  a	  period-­‐2	  profit.	  	  	   Thus,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   more	   naïve	   claims,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  conclude	  that	  sellers	  will	  invest	  less	  under	  the	  No	  Contract	  regime.	  The	  investment	  may	  be	  either	  higher	  or	   lower,	  depending	  on	  which	  effect	  dominates,	  the	  duration	  multiplier	  or	  the	  strategic	  motivation	  to	  keep	  customers	  happy.	  	  	  




Lock-­‐in	  forces	  consumers	  to	  stay	  for	  a	  longer	  period.	  No	  Contract	  can	   induce	   consumers	   to	   voluntarily	   stay	   for	   a	   longer	   period.	   In	  particular,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  lock-­‐in,	  No	  Contract	  sellers	  must	  invest	  to	  prevent	  customers	  from	  leaving.	   In	  essence,	  No	  Contract	  serves	  as	  an	  inducement	   to	   sellers	   to	   keep	   maintaining	   high	   value	   for	   their	  customers.	   In	   equilibrium,	   No	   Contract	   sellers	   invest	   in	   quality	   and	  consumers	   stay	  more	   than	  one	  period	   (hence	  making	   the	   investment	  cost	   justified).	   It	   is	   impossible	   to	   determine	   analytically	   if	   such	  investment	  is	  higher	  or	  lower	  than	  under	  lock-­‐in.	  	  Similar	   insights	   apply	   to	   relationship-­‐specific,	   or	   seller-­‐specific,	  investments	   by	   buyers.	   Buyers	   can	   invest,	   for	   example,	   in	   learning	  about	   the	  seller’s	  product,	  or	   in	  assets	   that	  are	  specific	   to	   the	  seller’s	  network	   (e.g.,	   phone	   apps	   or	   hardware	   that	   cannot	   be	   readily	  transferred	  to	  other	  networks).	  Again,	  the	  buyer	  may	  spend	  less	  in	  the	  short-­‐duration,	  No	  Contract	  regime.	  A	  buyer	  that	  expects	  to	  stay	  with	  the	   seller	   for	   a	   longer	   period	   of	   time	   will	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   make	  investments	   that	  are	  seller-­‐specific.	  But	   there	   is	  also	  a	  countervailing	  effect:	  Since	  seller-­‐specific	  investments	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  switching,	  these	   investments	   increase	   the	   expected	   duration	   of	   the	   seller-­‐buyer	  relationship	  under	  No	  Contract.	  In	  other	  words,	  anticipating	  a	  longer-­‐duration	   of	   the	   No	   Contract	   relationship	   brought	   about	   by	   her	  investment,	  the	  buyer	  will	  have	  a	  stronger	  ex	  ante	  incentive	  to	  invest.	  This	  effect	   is	  absent	  under	   lock-­‐in,	  where	  the	  duration	  is	   fixed	  at	  two	  periods.	   As	   with	   the	   seller’s	   investment	   in	   quality,	   the	   buyer’s	  investment	  under	  No	  Contract	  can	  be	  either	   lower	  or	  higher	  than	  the	  investment	  with	  lock-­‐in.	  	  
F.	  	  Signaling	  	  We	   have	   thus	   far	   assumed,	   implicitly,	   that	   information	   is	  symmetric.	   Specifically,	  we	   assumed	   that	   buyers	   know	   the	   quality	   of	  the	   seller’s	   product.26	  In	  many	   consumer	  markets	   this	   assumption	   is	  unrealistic.	   Buyers	   are	   only	   imperfectly	   informed	   about	   product	  quality.	  Consider	   the	  quality	  of	   cellular	   service	   (reception)	   in	  a	  given	  geographical	   area.	   The	   cell	   phone	   company	   knows	   the	   reception	  quality;	  consumers	  will	  generally	  be	  not	  as	  well	  informed.	  High-­‐quality	  sellers,	   H-­‐types,	   want	   to	   convey	   their	   high	   quality	   to	   buyers.	   But	  simply	  announcing	  “my	  product	  is	  of	  high	  quality”	  would	  not	  convince	  
                                                26	  We	   did	   allow	   for	   imperfect	   information,	   and	   even	   for	   biased	   perceptions,	  about	  other	  contractual	  dimensions.	  See	  supra	  Section	  D.	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 buyers.	   Anyone,	   including	   low-­‐quality	   sellers,	   L-­‐types,	   can	   simply	  announce	   that	   their	   product	   is	   of	   high	   quality.	   H-­‐sellers	   thus	   need	   a	  means	  of	  credibly	   signaling	   the	  high	  quality	  of	   their	  products.	  And,	   to	  be	  credible,	  the	  signal	  must	  be	  such	  that	  L-­‐sellers	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  use	  it.	  	  No	   Contract	   is	   such	   a	   signal.27	  Consider	   an	   H-­‐seller	   and	   an	   L-­‐seller.	  The	  H-­‐seller	  knows	  that	  if	  a	  consumer	  buys	  its	  product	  in	  period	  1,	   the	  consumer	  will	  be	  satisfied	  with	  the	  high	  quality	  and	  buy	   in	  the	  second	   period	   as	   well.	   The	   consumer	   will	   want	   to	   stay.	   Lock-­‐in	   is	  unnecessary	   for	   the	  H-­‐seller.	  The	  L-­‐seller,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  realizes	  that	   if	  a	  consumer	  buys	   its	  product	   in	  period	  1,	   the	  consumer	  will	  be	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  low	  quality	  and,	   in	  the	  absence	  of	   lock-­‐in,	  switch	  to	   another	   seller	   in	   period	   2.	   This	   differential	   effect	   of	   lock-­‐in	   on	  H-­‐	  and	  L-­‐sellers	  allows	  No	  Contract	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  credible	  signal	  of	  quality.	  H-­‐sellers	  will	  offer	  No	  Contract,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  need	  lock-­‐in	  to	  keep	  their	  customers.	  The	  No	  Contract	  design	  is	  cheap	  for	  H-­‐sellers.	  For	  L-­‐sellers,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  expensive	  to	  offer	  No	  Contract,	  and	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  offer	  lock-­‐in	  contracts.28	  	  The	   result	   is	   a	   signaling	   equilibrium:	   Instead	   of	   simply	  announcing	   “my	  product	   is	  of	  high	  quality,”	  H-­‐sellers	  will	  accompany	  this	  announcement	  with	  a	  No	  Contract	  offer.	  The	  message	  is	  clear:	  “We	  are	   sufficiently	   confident	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   our	   product	   that	  we	   don’t	  need	  to	  lock	  you	  in.”	  Many	  consumers	  will	  hear	  this	  message	  and	  buy	  from	  the	  H-­‐sellers.	  Of	  course,	  not	  all	  consumers	  will	  buy	  from	  H-­‐sellers.	  Now	  that	   they	  can	  credibly	   signal	   their	  high	  quality,	  H-­‐sellers	  will	  be	  able	   to	   charge	   high	   prices	   for	   their	   high-­‐quality	   products.	   Some	  consumers	  will	   prefer	   the	   low-­‐quality,	   low-­‐price	   products	   offered	   by	  the	  L-­‐sellers.29	  
                                                27	  Other	   contractual	   design	   features	   perform	   a	   similar	   signaling	   role.	   For	  example,	   car	   sellers	   offer	   expansive	  warranties	   to	   signal	   the	   high	   quality	   of	  their	  product.	  	  See	   Sanford	   Grossman,	   The	   Informational	   Role	   of	   Warranties	   and	   Private	  Disclosure	   about	   Product	   Quality,	   24	   Journal	   of	   Law	   and	   Economics	   461	  (1981).	   And	   sellers	   offer	   contracts,	   in	   which	   they	   bear	   high,	   liquidated	  damages	   in	  case	  of	  breach,	   to	  signal	   the	   low	  probability	   that	   they	  will	   in	   fact	  breach.	   See	   Philippe	   Aghion	   &	   Benjamin	   Hermalin,	   Legal	   Restrictions	   on	  Private	  Contracts	  Can	  Enhance	  Efficiency,	  6	  J.	  L.	  Econ.	  &	  Org.	  381	  (1990).	  28	  What	  if	  L-­‐sellers	  try	  to	  mimic	  H-­‐sellers	  and	  offer	  No	  Contract?	  The	  L-­‐sellers	  will	  experience	  more	  exit	  and	  their	  market	  share	  will	  drop.	  Therefore,	   in	  the	  long-­‐run	  equilibrium	  only	  H-­‐sellers	  will	  offer	  No	  Contract.	  29	  And	   some,	   imperfectly	   rational	   consumers	   will	   also	   buy	   from	   L-­‐sellers,	  because	  they	  underestimate	  the	  cost	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  See	  supra	  Section	  D.	  




	  The	   signaling	  equilibrium	  exhibits	   an	   interesting	   feature:	  When	  consumers	  want	  to	  exit	  –	  to	  switch	  to	  another	  seller	  –	  because	  of	  low	  product	   quality,	   lock-­‐in	   contracts	   prevent	   them	   from	   exiting.	   And	  when	  consumers	  are	  happy	  with	   the	  high	  quality	  product	  and	  do	  not	  want	  to	  exit,	  the	  H-­‐sellers’	  No	  Contract	  contracts	  allow	  them	  free	  exit.	  When	   consumers	   want	   to	   exit,	   they	   can’t.	   And	   when	   they	   can,	   they	  don’t	  want	  to.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  implications	  of	  the	  signaling	  account	  of	  No	   Contract	   is	   the	   emergence	   of	   this	   contract	   form	   in	   the	   elite	  segments	   of	   the	   market.	   We	   mentioned	   that	   No	   Contract	   began	   in	  various	   markets	   as	   a	   short-­‐term	   prepaid	   arrangement	   serving	   poor	  consumers,	  whose	   credit	   rating	   precluded	   the	   implicit	   financing	   that	  lock-­‐in	   provides,	   and	   whose	   volatile	   income	   necessitated	   easy	   exit	  options.	   These	   No	   Contracts	   were	   associated	   with	   low,	   rather	   than	  premium	   quality.	   Such	   prepaid	   wireless	   plans	   often	   came	   with	   low-­‐end	   handsets	   (phones)	   and	   low-­‐quality	   signal.	   But	   as	   No	   Contract	  expanded	   to	   the	  prime	   segments	   of	   the	  market,	   and	  became	   a	   signal	  for	  quality,	  the	  products	  it	   is	  packaged	  with	  also	  evolved,	  and	  now	  all	  major	   wireless	   carriers	   offer	   No	   Contracts	   with	   premium	   quality	  devices	  and	  service.30	  	  To	   take	   another	   example,	   until	   recently	   health	   clubs	   promoted	  their	   year-­‐long	   membership	   subscriptions,	   even	   when	   per-­‐visit	   (or	  per-­‐month)	  pricing	  was	  available.31	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  subscriptions	  –	  a	  lock-­‐in	   contract	   –	   was	   arguably	   responding	   to	   consumer	  overestimation	  of	   the	   frequency	  with	  which	   they	  will	   visit	   the	  health	  club:	   When	   the	   number	   of	   visits	   per	   year	   is	   overestimated,	   the	  effective	  per-­‐visit	  price	  under	  the	  subscription	  contract	  appears	  to	  be	  
                                                30	  See	   Cellphones:	  Verizon	   now	   selling	   smart	   phones	   for	   prepaid	   service,	  Verizon	   Wireless	   started	   selling	   smart	   phones	   for	   prepaid	   customers	   on	  Thursday,	   tapping	   into	   a	   market	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   domain	   of	   low-­‐end	  phones,	  Miami	   Herald	   (September	   3,	   2010);	   Ming-­‐Feng	   Chang,	   et	   al.,	  Performance	   of	   Hot	   Billing	   Mobile	   Prepaid	   Service,	   36	   Computer	   Networks	  269,	  270	   (2001);	  No-­‐Contract	   iPhone	  5	  Coming	   to	  Cricket	  Wireless	   Sept.	   28,	  Laptop	   Magazine,	   September	   13,	   2012	   (available	   at	  http://blog.laptopmag.com/no-­‐contract-­‐iphone-­‐5-­‐coming-­‐to-­‐cricket-­‐wireless-­‐sept-­‐28).	  31	  See	  Stefano	  DellaVigna	  and	  Ulrike	  Malmendier,	  Paying	  Not	  to	  Go	  to	  the	  Gym,	  96	  Amer.	  Econ.	  Rev.	  694,	  697	  (2006).	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 lower	   than	   it	   really	   is. 32 	  	   Recently,	   however,	   more	   health	   clubs,	  including	  leading	  national	  chains	  operating	  high-­‐end	  clubs,	  have	  been	  promoting	  the	  No	  Contract,	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐work-­‐out	  (usually	  month-­‐at-­‐a-­‐time,	   but	   also	   day-­‐pass)	   option. 33 	  When	   consumers	   form	   more	  accurate	   predictions	   about	   the	   frequency	   of	   health	   club	   attendance,	  and	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   true	   cost	   of	   lock-­‐in,	   the	   imperfect	  rationality	   story	   loses	   force	   and	   the	   advantage	   of	   lock-­‐in	   fades.	   This	  creates	   room	   for	   the	  signaling	  story:	   the	  high-­‐end	  health	  clubs	  signal	  their	  quality	  with	  No	  Contract.	  	  
G.	  	  Benefits	  of	  Lock-­‐in	  	  We	   have	   seen	   that	   lock-­‐in	   can	   lead	   to	   inefficient	   outcomes	   and	  hurt	   consumers.	   We	   have	   also	   seen	   that	   lock-­‐in	   is	   not	   necessarily	  better	  than	  No	  Contract	  in	  promoting	  investment,	  and	  that	  No	  Contract	  can	  play	  a	  useful	  signaling	  function.	  Is	  the	  deck	  stacked	  against	  lock-­‐in?	  Is	  lock-­‐in	  all	  bad?	  The	  answer	  is	  no.	  Lock-­‐in	  contracts	  entail	  a	  series	  of	  benefits,	  which	  are	  normally	  associated	  with	  long-­‐term	  contracts.	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  however,	  these	  benefits,	  while	  potentially	  important	  in	  other	  settings,	  play	  a	  relatively	  minor	  role	  in	  consumer	  markets.	  	  First,	   lock-­‐in	   can	   be	   efficient	   when	   the	   contracting	   parties	   are	  concerned	   about	   hold-­‐up.	   Assume	   that	   Seller	   and	   Buyer	   enter	   into	   a	  contract	   for	   the	   production	   and	   delivery	   of	   a	   unique,	   custom-­‐made	  good.	  Seller	  makes	  a	  substantial	  investment	  in	  machines	  and	  materials	  that	  are	  specifically	  designed	  for	  this	  unique	  order,	  and	  have	  no	  value	  for	   other	   orders	   that	   Seller	   may	   receive.	   After	   Seller	   makes	   this	  investment,	  Buyer	  might	  threaten	  to	  breach	  the	  contract	  unless	  Seller	  agrees	   to	   reduce	   the	   contract	   price.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   lock-­‐in	   –	  sufficiently	   large	   breach	   remedies	   that	   would	   prevent	   Buyer	   from	  threatening	   to	   exit	   and	   buy	   from	   a	   competing	   seller	   –	   would	   be	  efficient.	  Without	  such	  lock-­‐in,	  Seller	  would	  anticipate	  the	  hold-­‐up	  and	  refuse	   to	   invest	   –	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   both	   parties.34	  The	   hold-­‐up	  problem,	  however,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  figure	  prominently	  in	  markets	  for	  consumer	  goods	  and	  services,	  in	  which	  sellers	  rarely	  make	  substantial	  investments	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  a	  particular	  consumer.	  	  
                                                32	  Id.	  at	  695–	  96.	  33 	  See,	   for	   example,	   Bally	   Fitness’s	   “No	   Long	   Term	   Commitment”,	  http://www.ballyfitness.com/discover-­‐bally/gym-­‐memberships.aspx.	   As	   of	  September	  2012,	  LA	  Fitness	  advertised	  “No	  long	  term	  commitment	  required”	  on	  its	  homepage,	  http://www.lafitness.com.	  34	  See,	  e.g.,	  OLIVER	  HART,	  FIRMS,	  CONTRACTS,	  AND	  FINANCIAL	  STRUCTURE	  (1995).	  




Second,	   lock-­‐in	   can	   facilitate	   efficient	   risk-­‐allocation.	   Consider	  the	  case	  of	  commercial	  real-­‐estate:	  Company	  A	  owns	  a	  shopping	  mall	  on	  tract	  A,	  while	  company	  B	  owns	  a	  vacant	  lot	  on	  the	  adjacent	  tract	  B.	  Company	   A	   wants	   to	   use	   tract	   B	   as	   an	   overflow	   parking	   lot	   for	  weekend	   shoppers.	   The	   two	   companies	   can	   enter	   into	   a	  No	  Contract	  lease	  agreement,	  where	  each	  party	  can	  exit,	  without	  penalty,	  after	  one	  year;	  or	  they	  can	  enter	  into	  a	  lock-­‐in	  contract	  for	  two	  years.	  The	  choice	  between	   the	   two	   contractual	   arrangements	   depends,	   among	   other	  things,	   on	   how	   risk	   should	   be	   allocated	   between	   the	   parties.	   For	  example,	  Company	  B	  has	  several	  offers	  from	  potential	  lessees	  now,	  but	  is	  concerned	  that	  next	  year	  the	  commercial	  real-­‐estate	  market	  will	  be	  weaker.	   Company	  B	  prefers	   to	   allocate	   the	   risk	   of	   fluctuations	   in	   the	  real-­‐estate	  market	   to	  Company	  A,	   through	  a	   long-­‐term	  contract.	  Such	  an	   allocation	   of	   risk	   may	   well	   be	   efficient	   if	   Company	   A	   is	   better-­‐situated	  to	  bear	  this	  risk,	  especially	  if	  the	  volume	  of	  shoppers,	  visiting	  Company	  A’s	  mall,	   is	  unlikely	   to	  decline	  over	   the	   two-­‐year	  period.	   (If	  the	  risk	  of	  such	  a	  decline	  is	  large,	  Company	  A	  would	  prefer	  a	  1-­‐year,	  No	  Contract	   arrangement.)	   As	   a	   general	   matter,	   efficient	   risk	   allocation	  can	   be	   facilitated	   by	   either	  No	   Contract	   or	   lock-­‐in,	   depending	   on	   the	  circumstances.35	  In	   consumer	  markets,	   however,	   it	   seems	   that	   sellers	  will	   usually	   be	   the	   efficient	   risk-­‐bearers,	   suggesting	   that	  No	  Contract	  would	  be	  the	  superior	  choice.36	  	  Third,	   lock-­‐in	   can	  be	  an	  efficient	  means	  of	  providing	   credit	   and	  addressing	  liquidity	  concerns.	  A	  buyer	  who	  has	  only	  $80	  now	  but	  will	  have	  $120	  in	  the	  next	  period,	  would	  prefer	  a	  lock-­‐in	  contract	  with	  an	  [$80,	  $120]	  price	  schedule	  over	  a	  No	  Contract	  schedule	  of	  [$100,	  $100].	  Of	  course,	  credit	  and	  lock-­‐in	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand;	  without	  an	  assurance	  of	  future	  payment,	  plus	  interest,	  credit	  would	  not	  be	  available.	  While	  this	  efficiency	  justification	  for	   lock-­‐in	  is	  plausible,	   its	  practical	   importance	  is	   tempered	   by	   the	   availability	   of	   other	   sources	   of	   credit.	   Most	  consumers	  have	  access	  to	  credit	  cards	  and	  bank	  loans	  and	  should	  not	  need	   credit	   from	   sellers	   of	   consumer	   products	   and	   services.	   Indeed,	  banks	   and	   credit	   card	   issuers	   are	   probably	   the	   more	   efficient	  underwriter	   of	   consumer	   credit.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   for	  some	  small	  loans,	  the	  seller	  would	  be	  the	  superior	  creditor,	  since	  it	  can	  reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   non-­‐payment	   by	   threatening	   to	   cut	   service,	   and	  
                                                35	  Similar	  considerations	  affect	  the	  buy	  vs.	  rent	  choice.	  36	  Long-­‐term	   residential	   leases	   and	   car	   leases	   provide	   counterexamples	   of	  lock-­‐in	  contracts	  that	  efficiently	  allocate	  risk	  to	  the	  consumer.	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 spread	  the	  remaining	  risk	  by	   increasing	  the	  price	  of	   the	  service	  to	  all	  customers.	  	  Finally,	   lock-­‐in	   can	   provide	   an	   efficient	   commitment	   device	   for	  consumers	   who	   suffer	   from	   a	   weakness	   of	   the	   will.	   Consider	   a	  consumer	  who	   is	   contemplating	   a	   New	   Year’s	   resolution	   to	   visit	   the	  gym	  every	  week.	  This	  consumer,	   if	  he	   is	  sophisticated	  enough,	  would	  recognize	   that	   this	   resolution	   might	   not	   stick.	   A	   long-­‐term	   gym	  membership	  –	  a	   lock-­‐in	  contract	  –	  can	  act	  as	  a	  commitment	  device	  to	  encourage	   exercise	   by	   reducing	   the	   marginal	   cost	   of	   a	   gym	   visit.	  Commitment	  devices	  can	  prove	  valuable	  in	  other	  contexts	  as	  well.	  The	  internet	   venture,	   stickK.com,	   provides	   people	   with	   a	   means	   to	   set	   a	  long-­‐term	   plan	   and	   sacrifice	   a	   chosen	   sum	   of	   money	   if	   they	   deviate	  from	  their	  plan.	   In	  essence,	  the	  service	  being	  offered	  by	  stickK.com	  is	  an	   early	   termination	   penalty!	   The	   lock-­‐in-­‐as-­‐commitment	   account	  assumes	   that	   consumers	  are	  aware	  of	   their	  weakness	  of	   the	  will	   and	  seek	   to	   overcome	   it.	   The	   evidence,	   however,	   suggests	   that	   most	  consumers	   are	   not	   quite	   so	   sophisticated.	   And	   the	   demand	   for	   the	  services	  of	  stickK.com	  has	  yet	  to	  skyrocket.37	  	  Long-­‐term	   commitments	   are	   not	   without	   benefits.	   Yet,	   our	  assessment	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  lock-­‐in	  suggests	  that	  their	  magnitude,	  in	  consumer	  markets,	  is	  limited.	  	  	  
H.	  	  Summary	  	  We	   can	   now	   summarize	   our	   discussion	   of	   the	   economics	   of	  No	  Contract.	   The	   counter-­‐intuitive	   benchmark	   for	   our	   analysis	   was	   the	  irrelevance	   result:	   Lock-­‐in	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   is	   harmless.	   It	   affects	   a	  temporal	  shift	  in	  pricing	  –	  from	  the	  short-­‐term	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  –	  but	  without	  increasing	  (or	  decreasing)	  the	  total	  price	  that	  consumers	  pay.	  When	   lock-­‐in	   is	   enforced	   using	   loyalty	   programs,	   rather	   than	  
                                                37	  See	  Stefano	  DellaVigna	  and	  Ulrike	  Malmendier,	  Paying	  Not	  to	  Go	  to	  the	  Gym,	  96	   American	   Economic	   Review	   694	   (2006).	   A	   similar	   rational	   commitment	  account	  has	  been	  suggested	  for	  credit	  card	  teaser	  rates	  –	  the	  rate	  hike	  serves	  as	  a	  commitment	  not	  to	  borrow	  beyond	  the	  introductory	  period.	  But	  evidence	  that	  most	  of	  the	  borrowing	  is	  done	  at	  the	  post-­‐introductory	  rates	  is	  in	  tension	  with	   this	   conjecture.	   See	   Haiyan	   Shui	   and	   Lawrence	   Ausubel,	   Time	  Inconsistency	   in	   the	  Credit	  Card	  Market,	  Working	  Paper	   (2004)	   (available	  at	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622);	   David	   B.	   Gross,	   Nicholas	   S.	   Souleles,	   Do	  Liquidity	   Constraints	   and	   Interest	   Rates	   Matter	   for	   Consumer	   Behavior?	  Evidence	   from	   Credit	   Card	   Data,	   117	   Quarterly	   Journal	   of	   Economics	   149	  (2002).	  	  	  




termination	   penalties,	   the	   temporal	   price	   shift	  may	   be	   reversed,	   but	  the	  irrelevance	  result	  still	  holds.	  	  When	   combined	   with	   other	   market	   features,	   however,	   lock-­‐in	  can	   have	   real	   effects.	   First,	   the	   temporal	   shift	   in	   pricing	   can	   distort	  consumers’	   purchasing	   decisions,	   resulting	   in	   excessive	   purchases	   in	  the	   low-­‐price	   period	   and	   insufficient	   purchases	   in	   the	   high-­‐price	  periods.	   	   Second,	   locked-­‐in	   consumers	   might	   be	   deterred	   from	  switching	   to	  more	   efficient	   or	  more	   attractive	  products	   and	   services,	  as	  those	  emerge	  after	  the	  initial	  period	  but	  before	  the	  expiration	  of	  the	  long	  term	  commitment.	  Third,	   lock-­‐in	  makes	   it	  more	  difficult	   for	  new	  sellers	  to	  enter	  the	  market,	  thus	  inhibiting	  competition.	  	  When	   consumers	   are	   imperfectly	   rational,	   the	   costs	   of	   lock-­‐in	  increase.	  The	  concern	   is	   that	   the	   long-­‐term	  costs	  of	   lock-­‐in	  –	   the	  exit	  penalties,	  the	  escalating	  prices	  and	  the	  forgone	  opportunities	  –	  would	  be	  underestimated	  by	  consumers.	  The	  terms	  that	  these	  consumers	  will	  insist	  on,	  at	   the	  earlier	  period,	  will	   thus	   fail	   to	  reflect	   the	  subsequent	  burdens.	   As	   a	   result,	   consumers	   might	   make	   welfare-­‐reducing	  purchases.	  	  We	  explored	  the	  effects	  of	  Lock-­‐in	  vs.	  No	  Contract	  on	  investment	  decisions	  and	  signaling.	  We	  showed	  that,	  contrary	  to	  the	  conventional	  wisdom,	  lock-­‐in	  does	  not	  necessarily	  improve	  incentives	  to	  invest	  –	  by	  sellers	   and	   buyers	   –	   because	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   relationship	   is	   not	  necessarily	   shorter.	   In	   fact,	  No	  Contract	  might	   even	  provide	   superior	  incentives.	  As	   for	  signaling,	  No	  Contract	  allows	  high-­‐quality	  sellers	   to	  credibly	  signal	  their	  type	  and	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  low-­‐quality	  competitors.	  	  Finally,	   we	   considered	   the	   upside	   of	   lock-­‐in.	   Lock-­‐in	   does	  provide	   certain	   benefits	   –	   preventing	   hold-­‐up,	   allocating	   risk,	  facilitating	   credit	   transactions	   and	   supplying	   a	   commitment	   device.	  But	   these	   benefits	   appear	   relatively	   small,	   especially	   in	   consumer	  markets.	  Our	  tentative	  conclusion	  is	  that,	   in	  many	  consumer	  markets,	  the	   costs	   of	   lock-­‐in	   outweigh	   its	   benefits.	   No	   Contract	   is	   often	   the	  superior	  mode	  of	  contracting.	  	  Our	  economic	  analysis	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  recent	  expansion	  of	  No	  Contract.	  When	  consumers	  underestimated	   the	   cost	  of	   lock-­‐in,	   it	  was	  profitable	  for	  sellers	  to	  offer	  lock-­‐in	  contracts	  and	  to	  extract	  rents	  from	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 consumers	  who	  were	   committed	   and	   could	  not	   exit.	   This	   changed	  as	  consumers	   learned	   to	   appreciate	   the	   burdens	   of	   lock-­‐in.	   Recognizing	  that	   upfront	   discounts	   and	   perks	   come	   with	   escalating	   prices,	   exit	  penalties	   and	   costly	   inflexibility,	   consumers	   have	   become	   more	  cautious	   about	   the	   short-­‐term	   benefits	   that	   lock-­‐in	   provides.	   The	  improved	   consumer	   understanding	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   Lock-­‐in	   vs.	  No	   Contract	   prompted	   sellers	   to	   use	   No	   Contract	   as	   a	   bonding	  mechanism	  –	  as	  a	   commitment	   to	  maintain	  high	  quality	  and	   to	  avoid	  exploitation	  of	  consumers	  –	  and	  as	  a	  signaling	  device	  for	  high-­‐quality	  sellers.	  	  Misperceptions,	   however,	   remain.	   First,	   the	   proliferation	   of	   No	  Contract	  might	   suggest	   that	   consumers	   now	  overestimate	   the	   cost	   of	  lock-­‐in.	  While	   non-­‐salient	   risks	   are	   underestimated,	   salient	   risks	   can	  be	  overestimated.	  Such	  overestimation	  of	  risk	  explains	   the	  success	  of	  products	   like	   extended	   warranties	   for	   household	   appliances,	   and	  terrorism	   or	   flight-­‐crash	   insurance.	  38	  Arguably,	   the	   once	   non-­‐salient	  cost	   of	   lock-­‐in	   is	   becoming	   all	   too	   familiar	   to	   an	   increasingly	   large	  number	  of	  consumers,	  and	  a	  similar	   transformation	  –	   from	  under-­‐	   to	  over-­‐estimation	  is	  occurring.	  But	  even	  if	  consumers	  now	  overestimate	  the	   cost	   of	   lock-­‐in,	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   for	   concern.	   This	   will	   only	  hasten	   the	   rise	   of	   No	   Contract,	   which,	   as	   we	   have	   shown	   above,	   is	  generally	   better	   for	   consumers	   and	   for	   society	   than	   the	   lock-­‐in	  alternative.	  	  Another	  misperception	  related	  to	   lock-­‐ins	  concerns	  the	  value	  of	  loyalty	   awards.	   Since	   the	   switching	   costs	   that	   such	  programs	   rely	   on	  are	  more	   subtle—opportunity	   costs	   rather	   than	   outright	   penalties—consumers	  may	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  lock	  in	  effect.	  When	  signing	  up	  to	  received	  “points”	  for	  hotel	  stays,	  airline	  travel,	  or	  car	   rental,	   consumers	   envision	   the	   perks	   that	   these	   points	   will	  eventually	   buy,	   holding	   all	   else	   equal.	   That	   all	   else	   is	   not	   equal—namely,	   that	   prices	   would	   be	   higher	   and	   switching	   less	   profitable—often	  escapes	  the	   imagination	  of	  consumers.	  Even	  over	  time,	  the	  flow	  of	  loyalty	  awards	  would	  serve	  to	  numb	  the	  frustration	  associated	  with	  the	  drawbacks	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  No	  Contract	  trend	  emphasizes	  the	  elimination	  of	  termination	  fees,	  not	   loyalty	  programs.	  Indeed,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  loyalty	  programs	  is	  steadily	  increasing.39	  
                                                38	  Camerer	   et	   al.,	   Regulation	   for	   Conservatives:	   The	   Case	   for	   "Asymmetric	  Paternalism,”	  151	  U.	  Pa.	  L.	  Rev.1211	  (2003).	  	  39	  Consumer	   awareness	   of	   the	   costs	   of	   termination	   penalties	   and	   relative	  unawareness	   of	   the	   costs	   of	   loyalty	   programs	   can	   also	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	  different	  framings	  triggered	  by	  these	  two	  types	  of	  contractual	  switching	  costs.	  Penalties	  are	  perceived	  as	  losses,	  while	  loyalty	  rewards	  are	  perceived	  as	  gains.	  




	   	  
II.	  	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  NO	  CONTRACT	  	  We	  have	  shown	  that,	   in	  some	  cases,	   lock-­‐in	  can	  hurt	  consumers	  and	   reduce	   social	  welfare.	   These	   costs	  may	   explain	   the	   law’s	   critical	  approach	   to	   lock-­‐in.	  Courts	  have	  been	  policing	  early	   termination	   fees	  (ETFs)	   –	   the	   contractual	   footing	   of	   lock-­‐in	   –	   as	   unlawful	   liquidated	  damages,	  under	  the	  common	  law	  Penalty	  Doctrine	  and	  under	  Federal	  and	   State	   consumer	   protection	   laws.	   And	   legislators	   and	   regulators	  have	  been	  restricting	  the	  use	  of	  termination	  fees	  in	  specific	  consumer	  markets.	  	  	  The	  law	  of	  ETFs	  or,	  we	  should	  say,	  the	  law	  of	  lock-­‐in,	  is	  reviewed	  in	  Section	  A.	   Section	  B	   then	  evaluates	   this	  body	  of	   law	   in	   light	  of	   the	  theoretical	   framework	   developed	   in	   Part	   I.	  We	   argue	   that	   the	   law	   of	  lock-­‐in,	   based	   on	   the	   Penalty	   Doctrine,	   is	   fundamentally	   misguided.	  Section	   C	   goes	   beyond	   the	   Penalty	   Doctrine	   and	   considers	   a	   softer	  mode	   of	   regulation:	   disclosure	   mandates.	   We	   conclude	   that	   existing	  rules	  mandating	  the	  disclosure	  of	  ETFs	  will	  not	  substantially	  improve	  consumer	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  lock-­‐in	  and	  its	  implications.	  Section	   D	   ends	   this	   Part	   on	   a	   more	   positive	   note:	   Consumers	   are	  becoming	   increasingly	   informed	   about	   lock-­‐in,	   without	   the	   aid	   of	  disclosure	   mandates,	   and	   sellers	   are	   responding	   to	   the	   demand	  generated	  by	  these	  informed	  consumers.	  The	  No	  Contract	  trend,	  which	  is,	  in	  large	  part,	  a	  voluntary	  market	  response	  to	  consumers’	  increasing	  apprehensions	   about	   the	   costs	   of	   lock-­‐in,	   reduces	   the	   need	   for	   legal	  intervention.	  	  There	   is,	   however,	   an	   important	   caveat	   to	   this	   happy	   ending:	  Loyalty	   programs.	   As	   explained	   in	   Part	   I,	   loyalty	   programs	   and	   the	  switching	   costs	   they	   create	   can	   also	   lock	   consumers	   in.	   And	   while	  consumers	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	   sophisticated	   about	   the	  implications	   of	   ETFs,	   the	   same	   cannot	   be	   said,	   at	   least	   not	   yet,	   with	  respect	  to	  loyalty	  programs.	  For	  this	  reason,	  No	  Contract	  is	  responding	  to	   consumers’	   hostility	   towards	   ETFs,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   loyalty	  programs	  continue	  to	  expand.	  If	  legal	  intervention	  is	  to	  be	  considered,	  then—paradoxically—it	   should	   be	   focusing	   on	   loyalty	   programs	  
                                                                                                             And,	   as	   is	   well	   recognized,	   losses	   often	   loom	   larger	   than	   gains.	   See	   Daniel	  Kahneman	  and	  Amos	  Tversky,	  Prospect	  Theory:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Decision	  Under	  Risk,	  47	  Econometrica	  263	  (1979).	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 (which	   consumers	   tend	   to	   love)	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   abhorred	  termination	  penalties.	  	  
A.	  	  Unlawful	  Liquidated	  Damages	  	  Lock-­‐in	  is	  enforced	  by	  an	  agreed	  upon	  fine	  for	  early	  termination,	  usually	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   contract	   as	   an	   Early	   Termination	   Fee.	  Contract	  law	  views	  ETFs	  as	  liquidated	  damages	  for	  breach	  of	  contract	  by	   the	   consumer.	   Traditionally,	   these	   liquidated	   damages	   have	   been	  policed	  using	  the	  Penalty	  Doctrine,	  which	  allows	  courts	  to	  strike	  over-­‐compensatory	   liquidated	   damages	   clauses. 40 	  	   In	   addition,	   State	  consumer	  protection	  laws	  now	  commonly	  include	  specific	  prohibitions	  against	   excessive	   liquidated	   damages.41	  And	   Federal	   statutes	   include	  similar	  prohibitions	   in	  specific	  markets,	   such	  as	  consumer	   leases	  and	  consumer	  loans.42	  	  	  The	   main	   question	   the	   Penalty	   Doctrine	   addresses	   is	   whether	  ETFs	   are	   compensatory	   or	   punitive.	   In	   answering	   this	   question,	   the	  doctrinal	  methodology	  requires	  comparison	  between	  the	  magnitude	  of	  ETFs	   and	   the	   lost	   profit	   caused	   by	   early	   termination.	   Much	   of	   the	  relevant	  litigation	  involved	  cellphone	  contracts.	  	  	  Until	   approximately	   2008,	   the	   typical	   cellphone	   contract	   had	   a	  two-­‐year	   duration	   and	   a	   fixed	   ETF.	   A	   common	   provision	   would	  stipulate	  an	  ETF	  of	  $250,	  regardless	  of	  the	  time	  of	  early	  termination—whether	  it	  was	  in	  the	  first	  or	  the	  last	  month	  of	  the	  two-­‐year	  contract.	  The	   fixed	   ETFs	   in	   cellphone	   contracts	   provided	   an	   “easy”	   target	   for	  courts.	  Since	  the	  harm	  to	  the	  service	  provider	  from	  early	  termination	  is	   a	   function	  of	   the	   time	   left	   on	   the	  2-­‐year	   clock,	   such	   fixed	  ETFs	  did	  not	  provide	  a	   reasonable	   formula	   for	  ascertaining	   the	  actual	  harm	   to	  the	  breached-­‐against	  party.	   In	  particular,	  when	   termination	  occurred	  late	  in	  the	  two-­‐year	  period,	  the	  ETF	  was	  clearly	  over-­‐compensatory,	  ex	  post.43	  
                                                40	  See	   the	   Restatement	   (Second)	   of	   Contracts,	   Sec.	   356	   (1981);	   the	   Uniform	  Commercial	  Code,	  Sec.	  2-­‐718.	  41	  See,	  e.g.,	  Cal.	  Civ.	  Code	  §	  1671.	  42	  See	   the	   Federal	   Consumer	   Leasing	   Act,	   Pub.	   L.	   94–240,	  Mar.	   23,	   1976,	   90	  Stat.	  257	  (15	  §§	  1601,	  1640,	  1667,	  1167a	  to	  1667e);	  and	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Wall	  Street	   Reform	   and	   Consumer	   Protection	   Act	   of	   2010,	   Pub.	   L.	   111-­‐203,	   Sec.	  1414	  (restricting	  the	  use	  of	  prepayment	  penalties	  in	  mortgage	  contracts).	  43	  See,	  e.g.,	  Oren	  Bar-­‐Gill	  and	  Rebecca	  Stone,	  Mobile	  Misperceptions,	  23	  Harv	  J	  L	  &	  Tech	  49	  (2009).	  The	  cellphone	  companies	  claimed	  that	  while	  actual	  harm	  varied	   with	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   breach,	   even	   the	   low-­‐end	   of	   the	   actual-­‐harm	  range	  exceeded	  the	  fixed	  ETF.	  See	  In	  re	  Cellphone	  Termination	  Fee	  Cases,	  193	  




	  Still,	  courts	  struggled	  to	  find	  that	  the	  fixed	  ETF	  clearly	  exceeded	  actual	   harm.	   The	   comparison	   between	   actual	   harm	   and	   the	   ETF	  was	  made	   difficult	   by	   controversy	   over	   the	   appropriate	   method	   of	  calculating	   lost	  profits	   from	  consumer	  exit.	  As	  a	   result,	   courts	   turned	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  question	  of	  intent:	  Was	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  ETFs	  compensatory?44	  In	  a	   leading	  2011	  California	  decision,	  In	  re	  Cellphone	  
Termination	   Fee	   Cases	   [hereinafter:	   “Cellphone	   Cases”], 45 	  the	   court	  struck	   down	   the	   ETF	   in	   Sprint’s	   cellphone	   contracts	   based	   on	   the	  absence	   of	   a	   compensatory	   purpose.	   Relying	   on	   internal	  communications	  between	  Sprint	  employees,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  ETFs	  were	   intended	   to	   reduce	   so-­‐called	   “churn	   rates”—the	   rate	   at	   which	  customers	   terminate	   contracts	   early—rather	   than	   to	   cover	  estimated	  harm	   to	   the	   carrier	   from	   early	   terminations.46	  In	   other	   words,	   the	  court	   found	  that	  an	  ETF	  was	  unenforceable	  because	  of	   the	  purpose	   it	  served:	  deterrence	  of	  early	  termination,	  rather	  than	  compensation.	  	  	  The	  practical	  ramifications	  of	  the	  ruling	  in	  the	  Cellphone	  Cases,	  or	  of	   other	   decisions	   that	   struck	   the	   ETF	   provisions	   in	   cellphone	  contracts,	   is	   limited	  by	   the	   following	   two	   factors:	   First,	   carriers	   have	  argued,	  with	  some	  success,	  that	  state	  law,	  including	  restrictions	  on	  the	  magnitude	   of	   liquidated	   damages,	   is	   preempted	   by	   the	   Federal	  Communications	   Act	   (“FCA”),	   which	   prohibits	   states	   from	   regulating	  cellphone	   rates.47	  Second,	   in	   response	   to	   the	   ETF	   litigation	   and	   the	  
                                                                                                             Cal	   App	   4th	   298,	   122	   Cal	   Rptr	   3d	   726	   (2011),	   rehg	   denied	   (Mar.	   24,	   2011),	  review	   denied	   (June	   15,	   2011),	   cert	   denied,	   132	   S	   Ct	   555,	   181	   L	   Ed	   2d	   397	  (2011).	  44	  The	  focus	  on	  intent	  is,	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  result	  of	  a	  California-­‐specific	  rule.	  See	  Hitz	  v.	  First	   Interstate	  Bank,	  38	  Cal.App.4th	  274,	  289,	  44	  Cal.Rptr.2d	  890	  (Cal.App.	  1	  Dist.,1995)	  (“[T]he	   focus	   is	  not	   ...	  on	  whether	   liquidated	  damages	  are	   disproportionate	   to	   the	   loss	   from	   breach,	   but	   on	   whether	   they	   were	  intended	   to	   exceed	   loss	   substantially—a	   result	   of	   which	   is	   to	   generate	   a	  profit.)	  45	  193	   Cal	   App	   4th	   298,	   122	   Cal	   Rptr	   3d	   726	   (2011),	   rehg	   denied	   (Mar.	   24,	  2011),	  review	  denied	  (June	  15,	  2011),	  cert	  denied,	  132	  S	  Ct	  555,	  181	  L	  Ed	  2d	  397	  (2011).	  46	  Id.	  47	  Section	  332	  of	  the	  FCA,	  47	  USC	  151–615(b)	  (2006)	  provides	  that	  “no	  State	  or	   local	   government	   shall	   have	   any	   authority	   to	   regulate	   the	   entry	   of	   or	   the	  rates	  charged	  by	  any	  commercial	  mobile	  service	  or	  any	  private	  mobile	  service,	  except	  that	  this	  paragraph	  shall	  not	  prohibit	  a	  State	  from	  regulating	  the	  other	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  commercial	  mobile	  services.”	  Some	  courts	  have	  held	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 FCC’s	   possible	   regulatory	   intervention,	   every	   major	   carrier	   in	   the	  United	   States	   moved	   from	   invariant	   to	   prorated	   ETFs—fees	   that	  decline	   in	   proportion	   to	   the	   remaining	   duration	   on	   the	   contract.48	  Prorated	  ETFs	   are	  much	  harder	   to	   attack	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   the	  Penalty	  Doctrine	   and,	   indeed,	   there	  has	  been	  no	   litigation	   involving	  prorated	  ETFs.	  	  Beyond	   consumer	   telecommunications	   contracts,	   liquidated	  damages	   doctrines	   are	   often	   used	   to	   regulate	   early	   termination	   in	   a	  variety	   of	   long-­‐term	   contracts.	   In	   leasing	   contracts,	   for	   example,	   the	  Federal	  Consumer	  Leasing	  Act	  (CLA),	  using	  language	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	   Common	   Law	   Penalty	   Doctrine,	   prohibits	   super-­‐compensatory	  liquidated	  damages.49	  The	  CLA	  has	  been	   effectively	   used	   to	   challenge	  
                                                                                                             that	   ETF	   contract	   provisions	   constitute	   “rates	   charged”	   and	   are	   thus	  preempted.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Chandler	  v	  AT&T	  Wireless	  Servs,	  Inc,	  No	  04–180,	  2004	   US	   Dist	   LEXIS	   14884,	   at	   *4	   (SD	   Ill	   July	   21,	   2004);	   Redfern	   v.	   AT&T	  Wireless	  Servs,	  Inc,	  No	  03–206,	  2003	  US	  Dist	  LEXIS	  25745,	  at	  *2-­‐*3	  (SD	  Ill	  June	  16,	   2003).	   Other	   courts	   have	   held	   that	   liquidated	   damages	   in	   consumer	  contracts	  are	  “other	  terms	  and	  conditions”	  and	  are	  thus	  not	  preempted	  by	  the	  FCA.	  See	  In	  re	  Cellphone	  Termination	  Fee	  Cases,	  193	  Cal	  App	  4th	  298	  (2011);	  Brown	  v	  Wash/Balt	  Cellular,	  Inc,	  109	  F	  Supp	  2d	  421,	  423	  (D	  Md	  2000).	  At	  this	  time,	   the	   FCC	   has	   yet	   to	   issue	   a	   ruling	   on	   this	   matter,	   although	   it	   began	  hearings	   in	   2008.	   See	   Early	   Termination	   Fees,	  http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/early-­‐termination-­‐fees	  (last	  visited	  July	  24,	  2012).	  	  48	  Verizon	   Wireless’	   contract	   has	   an	   ETF	   of	   $350,	   less	   $10	   for	   each	   month	  completed	  (www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/globalText?textName=CUSTOMER_AGREEMENT&jspName=footer/customerAgreement.jsp,	   last	   visited	   July	   24,	   2012);	  AT&T’s	   contract	   has	   an	   ETF	   of	   $325,	   less	   $10	   for	   each	   month	   completed	  (http://www.att.com/shop/legalterms.html?toskey=wirelessCustomerAgreement&,	   last	   visited	   July	   24,	   2012);	   Sprint’s	   contract	   has	   an	   ETF	   of	   months	  remaining	   on	   the	   contract	   times	   $10	   ($20	   for	   “advanced	   devices),	   with	   a	  maximum	  of	  $200	  and	  minimum	  of	  $50	  (maximum	  of	  $350	  and	  minimum	  of	  $100	   for	   advanced	   devices)	   (http://support.sprint.com	  /support/article/Learn_about_early_termination_fee/case-­‐sp061027-­‐20110823-­‐171256,	  last	  visited	  July	  24,	  2012);	  (T-­‐Mobile’s	  contract	  has	  an	  ETF	  of	  $200	  for	  over	  180	  days	  remaining,	  $100	  for	  91–180	  days	  remaining,	  $50	  for	  30–90	  days	  remaining,	  $50	  or	  monthly	  charges,	  whichever	  is	  less,	  for	  less	  than	  30	  days	   remaining	   (http://support.t-­‐mobile.com/docs/DOC-­‐2938	   last	   visited	  July	   24,	   2012).	   See	   also	   Oren	   Bar-­‐Gill	   and	   Rebecca	   Stone,	   Mobile	  Misperceptions,	  23	  Harv	  J	  L	  &	  Tech	  49,	  118	  (2009).	  49	  Pub.	  L.	  94–240,	  Mar.	  23,	  1976,	  90	  Stat.	  257	  (15	  §§	  1601,	  1640,	  1667,	  1167a	  to	   1667e).	   Under	   the	   statute,	   liquidated	   damages	   are	   allowed	   only	   if	  “reasonable”	  in	  the	  light	  of	  (1)	  anticipated	  or	  actual	  harm,	  (2)	  the	  difficulties	  of	  




early	   termination	   fees	   used	   by	   auto	   companies	   and	   dealerships.	  Automobiles	  depreciate	   substantially	  when	   first	  purchased	  or	   leased.	  Auto	   companies	   employed	   ETFs	   to	   ensure	   that	   most	   (or	   all)	   of	   this	  depreciation	   is	   born	   by	   the	   consumer	   who	   terminates	   the	   lease	  agreement	  prematurely.	  Some	  companies	  went	  further,	  setting	  ETFs	  in	  excess	   of	   the	   total	   payments	   due	   under	   the	   lease	   agreement.	   Courts	  have	   generally	   invalidated	   ETFs	   where	   they	   found	   that	   the	   early	  termination	   of	   the	   lease	   would	   grant	   a	   windfall	   to	   the	   lessor.50	  As	   a	  result,	   auto	   companies	   reduced	   the	   magnitude	   of	   their	   ETFs.	  Specifically,	  the	  companies	  revised	  contracts	  that	  set	  ETFs	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  total	  payments	  due	  under	  the	  lease	  agreement.51	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  some	  courts	  strike	  ETFs	  based	  on	  a	  finding	  that	  the	   fee	   exceeds	   actual	   harm	   or	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   fee	   is	   not	  compensatory.	  Other	  courts,	  reluctant	   to	  second-­‐guess	  the	  wisdom	  of	  lock-­‐in	  contracts,	   refuse	   to	   find	   that	   the	  ETFs	  are	   impermissibly	  high	  or	   lack	   a	   compensatory	   purpose.	   Alternatively,	   such	   courts	   question	  the	   very	   classification	   of	   ETFs	   as	   liquidated	   damages.	   Instead,	   they	  characterize	   ETFs	   as	   “alternative	   means	   of	   performance.”	   The	  consumer	  can	  perform	  the	  contract	  by	  continuing	  to	  pay	  the	  monthly	  service	  fee	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  lock-­‐in	  contract	  or	  she	  can	  terminate	  and	  pay	   the	  ETF.	  Under	   this	   interpretation,	   a	   consumer’s	   decision	   to	  terminate	   the	   contract	   is	   not	   considered	   a	   breach,	   and	   so	   the	   ETF	   is	  not	  considered	  liquidated	  damages.52	  
                                                                                                             proof	   of	   loss,	   (3)	   and	   the	   inconvenience	   or	   nonfeasibility	   of	   otherwise	  obtaining	  an	  adequate	  remedy.	  See	  15	  USC	  §	  1667b(b).	  	  50	  See,	  for	  example,	  Mitchell	  v	  Ford	  Motor	  Credit	  Co,	  702	  F	  Supp	  2d	  1356,	  1368	  (MD	  Fla	  2010).	  51	  Id.	  52	  See,	  for	  example,	  Hutchison	  v	  AT&T	  Internet	  Services,	  Inc,	  CV07-­‐3674	  SVW	  (JCX),	   2009	   WL	   1726344	   (CD	   Cal	   May	   5,	   2009)	   affd	   sub	   nom	   Hutchison	   v.	  Yahoo!	  Inc.,	  396	  F	  App'x	  331	  (9th	  Cir.	  2010)	  (“the	  ETF's	  true	  function	  is	  not	  as	  a	   penalty,	   but…[as]	   an	   alternative	   performance	   provision);	   Minnick	   v.	  Clearwire	   US,	   LLC,	   683	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   1179,	   1184	   (W.D.	   Wash.	   2010)	   (same);	  Schneider	   v.	   Verizon	   Internet	   Services,	   Inc.,	   400	   F.	   App'x	   136,	   138	   (9th	   Cir.	  2010)	  (same);	  Williams	  v.	  Oberon	  Media,	  Inc.,	  CV098764-­‐JFW	  AGRX,	  2010	  WL	  1644888	   (C.D.	   Cal.	   Mar.	   4,	   2010)	   (same,	   in	   a	   video	   game	   service	   contract).	  Among	   the	   courts	   that	   have	   viewed	   ETFs	   as	   “alternative	   means	   of	  performance,”	   some	   have	   sought	   to	   support	   their	   ruling	   by	   finding	   that	   the	  magnitude	   of	   the	   ETF	   is	   “relatively	   equal”	   to	   the	   cost,	   to	   the	   consumer,	   of	  fulfilling	   the	   contract.	   See,	   for	   example,	   Minnick	   v.	   Clearwire	   U.S.	   LLC,	   174	  Wash.	  2d	  443,	  446,	  275	  P.3d	  1127,	  1129	  (2012)	  (“Because	  the	  ETF,	  at	  the	  time	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  Shifting	   to	   market-­‐specific	   rules,	   in	   certain	   consumer	   markets	  statutes	   and	   regulations	   set	   specific	   limits	   on	   the	   permissible	  magnitude	  of	  ETFs.	   In	   the	  U.S.,	   the	  most	  prominent	   regulation	  of	   this	  sort	   targets	   prepayment	   penalties	   in	  mortgage	   contracts.	   The	   Dodd-­‐Frank	   Wall	   Street	   Reform	   and	   Consumer	   Protection	   Act	   of	   2010	  restricts	   prepayment	   penalties	   to	   a	   subset	   of	   prime,	   fixed-­‐rate	  mortgages.	   Moreover,	   when	   allowed,	   prepayment	   penalties	   are	  restricted	   in	   amount	   and	  duration:	  The	  prepayment	  penalty	  may	  not	  exceed	  three	  percent	  of	  the	  prepaid	  amount	  during	  the	  first	  year	  after	  consummation,	   two	   percent	   during	   the	   second	   year	   after	  consummation,	   and	   one	   percent	   during	   the	   third	   year	   after	  consummation.	  There	  can	  be	  no	  prepayment	  penalty	  after	   the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  year	  after	  consummation.53	  	  
B.	  	  Is	  the	  Penalty	  Doctrine	  the	  Proper	  Framework?	  	  	  The	   normative	   framework	   in	   Part	   I	   established	   the	   economic	  grounds	   for	   intervention	   in	   lock-­‐in	   contracts,	   by	   identifying	   the	  situations	   when,	   and	   the	   reasons	   why,	   lock-­‐in	   arrangements	   hurt	  consumers	   and	   reduce	   total	  welfare.	  We	   then	   saw	   that	   courts	   in	   fact	  scrutinize	   lock-­‐in	   contracts	   and	   release	   consumers	   from	   their	   long-­‐term	   obligations	   when	   the	   ETFs	   are	   deemed	   excessive	   under	   the	  Penalty	  Doctrine.	   In	   this	  section	  we	  ask	  whether	   the	   legal	  scrutiny	  of	  ETFs	   under	   the	   Penalty	   Doctrine	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   economic	  grounds	   for	   intervention.	   We	   find	   limited	   consistency.	   The	   Penalty	  Doctrine,	  and	  related	  statutory	  rules,	  are	  not	  well-­‐suited	  to	  implement	  the	  economics	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  	  
                                                                                                             of	   contracting,	   provided	   customers	  with	   a	   ‘real	   option’	   and	  was	  of	   relatively	  equal	  value	  with	  the	  alternative	  option	  of	  fulfilling	  the	  contract,	  we	  hold	  that	  it	  is	  an	  alternative	  performance	  provision	  and	  not	  a	  liquidated	  damages	  clause”	  (emphasis	  added)).	  	  Other	   courts	   held	   that	   ETFs	   were	   not	   “alternative	   means	   of	  performance,”	   noting	   that	   “a	   contract	   expressed	   to	   be	   performed	   in	   the	  alternative	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   contract	   contemplating	   but	   a	   single,	   definite	  performance	   with	   an	   additional	   charge	   contingent	   on	   the	   breach	   of	   that	  performance.”	  Cellphone	  Cases,	  193	  Cal	  App	  4th	  298,	  at	  328	  (2011).	  53	  Pub.	  L.	  111-­‐203,	  Sec.	  1414.	  Similar	  restrictions	  exist	  in	  Europe,	  but	  reaching	  a	  broader	   range	  of	   consumer	   loans.	   In	  Germany,	   fees	   for	  early	   repayment	  of	  consumer	  loans	  may	  not	  exceed	  1	  percent	  of	  the	  amount	  repaid	  early	  (and	  0.5	  percent	  if	  terminated	  within	  a	  year	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  loan	  agreement),	  nor	  may	  it	  exceed	  the	  amount	  of	  interest	  that	  would	  have	  been	  paid	  during	  the	  period	  between	  the	  early	  and	  scheduled	  repayment.	  See	  German	  Civil	  Code	  §	  502.	  




In	   a	   fundamental	  way,	   the	   question	   asked	   by	   courts—are	  ETFs	  over-­‐compensatory—is	   the	  wrong	   question.	   ETFs	   are	   part	   of	   lock-­‐in	  contracts	   in	   which	   consumers	   enjoy	   upfront	   discounts	   and	   sellers	  often	  assume	  upfront	  losses.	  The	  ETF	  determines	  the	  profit	  that	  sellers	  can	   enjoy	   in	   the	   remaining	   duration	   of	   the	   contract.	   Higher	   ETFs	  correspond	   to	   higher	   ex	   post	   profits	   and,	   thus,	   to	   higher	   harm	   from	  early	  termination.	  But,	  as	  we	  have	  shown,	  this	  link	  between	  ETFs	  and	  harm	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   lock-­‐ins	   are	   welfare	   increasing.	   More	  generally,	  ETFs	  can	  be	  harmful	  to	  consumers—and	  inefficient—even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  over-­‐compensate	  sellers.	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   merits	   of	   the	   inquiry	   into	   the	   magnitude	   of	  ETFs	   –	   are	   they	   compensatory,	   tracking	   the	   seller’s	   lost	   profits,	   or	  punitive,	  exceeding	  these	  lost	  profits	  –	  is	  unclear.	  ETFs	  come	  with	  low	  up-­‐front	   prices.	   It	   makes	   little	   sense	   to	   compare	   ETFs	   to	   back-­‐end	  profits,	  without	  considering	  the	  front-­‐end	  losses	  that	  sellers	  commonly	  incur.	  There	  is	  no	  a-­‐priori	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  high	  up-­‐front	  prices	  and	  low	  ETFs	  are	  better,	  for	  consumers,	  than	  low	  up-­‐front	  prices	  and	  high	  ETFs.	  As	  we	  showed	  in	  Part	  I,	  the	  harm	  from	  ETFs	  is	  more	  subtle,	  and	  is	   due	   to	   the	   way	   lock-­‐in	   interacts	   with	   factors	   like	   elasticity	   of	  demand,	   changes	   in	   technology,	   and—importantly—consumer	  misperceptions.	  	  The	   intent-­‐focused	   inquiry	   applied	   in	   the	   Cellphone	   Cases	   is	  similarly	  unhelpful.	  The	   court	   struck	   the	  ETF	  based	  on	  evidence	   that	  Sprint	  intended	  the	  ETF	  to	  reduce	  “churn	  rates.”	  Because	  they	  served	  a	  deterrence,	  rather	  than	  compensatory	  purpose,	  the	  ETFs	  were	  deemed	  unenforceable.54	  But	   deterrence	   and	   compensation	   are	   not	   mutually	  exclusive.	   ETFs	   can	   both	   work	   to	   deter	   early	   termination	   and	  compensate	   carriers	   for	   lost	   profit	   when	   deterrence	   fails.	   Moreover,	  even	   perfectly	   compensatory	   liquidated	   damages	   are	   commonly	  intended	  to	  influence	  the	  perform-­‐or-­‐breach	  decision.	  	  	  The	   proper	   inquiry	   is	   not	   whether	   the	   business	   is	   enjoying	  super-­‐compensatory	   damages	   or	   whether	   it	   harbored	   a	   non-­‐compensatory	   purpose	   when	   adding	   the	   ETF.55	  Rather,	   the	   proper	  inquiry	  is	  whether	  the	  consumer’s	  decision	  to	  switch	  among	  sellers,	  or	  
                                                54	  See	  discussion	  of	  the	  Cellphone	  Cases,	  supra.	  55	  And	   the	   distinction	   between	   ETFs	   as	   liquidated	   damages	   and	   ETFs	   as	  “alternative	   means	   of	   performance”	   (see	   supra	   note	   52	   and	   accompanying	  text)	  seems	  arbitrary	  and	  without	  any	  solid	  economic	  foundation.	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 to	  vary	  the	  quantity	  purchased,	  or	  to	  upgrade	  the	  quality	  of	  service,	  is	  distorted.	   This	   is	   an	   inquiry	   that	   courts,	   unfortunately,	   are	   largely	  incompetent	   to	   perform,	   because	   it	   depends	   on	   factors	   beyond	   the	  evidence	  presented	  in	  individual	  cases.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   economic	   analysis	   of	   Part	   I	   sheds	   doubt	   on	   the	  desirability	   of	   any	   legal	   rule	   that	   bans	   or	   restricts	   ETFs.	   Legal	  restrictions	   on	   lock-­‐in	   prevent	   contract	   differentiation	   and	   hurt	  consumers	   who	   prefer	   low	   up-­‐front	   prices,	   even	   when	   they	   are	  coupled	  with	  high	  ETFs.	  Also,	  as	  explained	  in	  Part	  I.E.,	  No	  Contract	  can	  serve	   as	   a	   signal	   of	   quality.	   To	   serve	   this	   beneficial	   signaling	   role,	  sellers	   must	   be	   able	   to	   freely	   choose	   between	   the	   two	   contractual	  designs	   –	   No	   Contract	   and	   Lock-­‐in.	   If	   the	   law	   were	   to	   impose	   No	  Contract	  on	  all	  sellers,	  the	  signal	  would	  disappear.	  	  The	  divergence	  between	  the	  Penalty	  Doctrine	  and	  the	  economics	  of	  lock-­‐in	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  courts	  wielding	  the	  doctrine	  never	  reach	  good	   outcomes.	   Indeed,	   since	   lock-­‐in	   is	   often	   less	   efficient	   than	   No	  Contract	  (as	  shown	  in	  Part	  I),	  striking	  an	  ETF	  may	  well	  be	  beneficial.	  In	  the	   cellphone	  market,	   courts	   applying	   the	   penalty	   doctrine,	   together	  with	   the	   increasing	   salience	   of	   ETFs	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   consumers,	  instigated	  a	  market-­‐wide	  shifted	  from	  fixed	  to	  graduated	  ETFs.	  Now,	  as	  the	   two-­‐year	   contract	   duration	   draws	   to	   an	   end,	   the	   ETF	   is	  proportionally	   adjusted	   downward.	   This	   change	   (likely)	   satisfies	   the	  demands	   of	   contract	   law	   doctrine	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   design	   of	  liquidated	  damages.	   It	   is	   also	   likely	   to	  benefit	   consumers.	   In	   essence,	  the	  move	  to	  a	  declining	  ETF	  brings	  us	  closer	  to	  a	  No	  Contract	  design.	  Consumers	   can	   more	   easily	   exit	   the	   contract,	   especially	   in	   the	   later	  periods.	   Of	   course,	   the	   reduced	   back-­‐end	   revenue	   stream	   –	   from	   the	  lower	  ETFs	  or	  from	  the	  lower	  back-­‐end	  prices	  that	  carriers	  can	  charge	  –	  would	  translate	  into	  smaller	  phone	  subsidies	  at	  the	  front-­‐end.	  But,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  total	  effect	  will	  generally	  be	  welfare-­‐enhancing.	  	  
C.	  	  Disclosing	  ETFs?	  	  If	   liquidated	   damages	   doctrine	   is	   ill-­‐suited	   to	   police	   lock-­‐in	  contracts,	  what	  can	  be	  done	  instead?	  Disclosure	  regulation	  offers	  one	  alternative.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   aforementioned	   restrictions	   on	   the	  magnitude	  of	  ETFs,	  the	  law	  requires	  that	  sellers	  disclose	  their	  ETFs	  to	  consumers.	  Moreover,	  since	  consumers	  rarely	  read	  fine	  print	  contract	  terms,	   lawmakers	  have	  devised	  specific	  disclosure	  mandates	  that	  aim	  to	   make	   ETFs	   more	   conspicuous.	   For	   example,	   under	   the	   CLA,	  consumer	   lease	   agreements	   must	   display,	   “accurately	   and	   in	   a	   clear	  and	  conspicuous	  manner,”	  a	  statement	  of	   the	  conditions	  under	  which	  




the	  lease	  may	  be	  prematurely	  terminated,	  and	  the	  amount	  or	  method	  for	  determining	  any	  ETF.56	  	  	  Consumer	   awareness	   and	   understanding	   of	   ETFs	   and	   their	  implications	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   assessing	   the	   potential	   harm	  from	  lock-­‐in.	  Disclosure	  regulation	  would	  thus	  seem	  to	  be	  appropriate.	  Unfortunately,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   doubt	   the	   efficacy	   of	   existing	   ETF	  disclosures.	  First,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  consumers	  will	  read	  even	  the	  “clear	  and	   conspicuous”	   disclosures,	   which	   often	   come	   bundled	  with	  much	  other	   fine	  print	  matter.	   Second,	   to	   understand	   the	   implications	   of	   an	  ETF,	   it	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   know	   that	   the	   contract	   includes	   an	   ETF	   and	  how	   large	   the	   ETF	   is;	   consumers	   must	   also	   be	   able	   to	   accurately	  predict	   the	   likelihood	   of	   triggering	   such	   fees	   (or	   forgoing	   beneficial	  exit	   because	   of	   such	   fees).	   Since	   an	   ETF	   is	   triggered	   by	   early	  termination,	   the	   likelihood	   of	   triggering	   an	   ETF	   depends	   on	   the	  probability	   that	  early	   termination	  will	  become	  desirable.	  To	  estimate	  this	  probability,	   consumers	  need	   information	  on	  potential	   changes	   in	  the	  market,	  in	  technology,	  and	  in	  their	  own	  propensity	  to	  consume	  the	  product	   (which,	   in	   turn,	   is	   a	   function	  of	   changes	   in	   their	   income	  and	  their	  tastes).	  Existing	  disclosures	  do	  not	  provide	  such	  information.	  	  	  
D.	  	  Informed	  Choice	  Without	  Mandated	  Disclosure	  	  	  Can	   consumers	   make	   informed	   choice	   about	   contract	   duration	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  mandated	  disclosure	  of	  ETF?	  Unlike	  other	  legal	  terms	   in	   form	   contracts,	   which	   often	   remain	   obscure	   to	   most	  consumers,	   ETFs	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	   salient.	   Many	   cellphone	  users	  know	  that	   they	  are	  entitled	   to	  an	  “upgrade”	  (namely,	  a	  reset	  of	  the	   contract	   duration	   back	   to	   “period	   1”)	   every	   two	   years.	   They	  understand	  that	  their	  contract	  does	  not	  allow	  them	  to	  switch	  to	  a	  new	  provider	  even	  if	  that	  competitor	  offers	  better	  technology	  or	  price.	  And	  they	   know	   that	   technology	   often	   advances	   at	   a	   pace	   that	   makes	   the	  lock-­‐in	   costly.	   Similarly,	   health	   club	  members	  have	  gradually	   learned	  
                                                56	  15	  USC	  §	  1667a(11).	  See	  Miller	  v.	  Nissan	  Motor	  Acceptance	  Corp.,	  362	  F.3d	  209	  (3d	  Cir.	  2004)	  (holding	  that	  an	  automobile	  lease	  violated	  CLA’s	  disclosure	  requirements	   in	   failing	   to	   specify	   two	   methods	   by	   which	   the	   lessor	   could	  calculate	  an	  ETF).	  See	  also	  Corrigan	  v	  First	  Horizon	  Home	  Loan	  Corp,	  CIV	  09–12721,	   2010	  WL	   728780	   (ED	  Mich	   Feb	   25,	   2010)	   (challenging	   adequacy	   of	  disclosure	  under	  §	  1667a	  TILA	  of	  a	  $500	  ETF	  for	  prematurely	  closing	  a	  home	  equity	  line	  of	  credit	  with	  a	  $50	  annual	  fee).	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 that	  low	  per-­‐period	  membership	  prices	  come	  with	  long-­‐term	  hardline	  commitments.	   People	   learn	   about	   the	   cost	   of	   lock-­‐in	   from	   their	   own	  experience	  as	  “repeat”	  consumers	  of	  products	  and	  services	  that	  come	  (or	   came)	  with	  ETFs.	  Or	   they	   learn	   from	   the	  experience	  of	  others,	   as	  stories	   propagate	   about	   difficulties	   encountered	   by	   consumers	   who	  tried	  to	  quit	  a	  service.	  	  This	   increased	   consumer	   awareness	   has	   been	   recognized	   by	  several	  courts.	  In	  Hutchison	  v.	  Yahoo!	  Inc.,	  the	  Internet	  service	  provider	  waived	   an	   upfront	   installation	   fee	   (of	   approximately	   $175)	   and	  provided	   a	   discounted	   monthly	   fee	   in	   return	   for	   a	   12-­‐month	  commitment	  backed	  by	  an	  ETF.	  The	  court	  held	  that	   the	  ETF	  does	  not	  constitute	   unlawful	   liquidated	   damages;	   rather	   it	   presents	   the	  consumer	  with	  a	  “rational	  choice.”57	  The	  court	  explained:	  	   “[W]hen	  Plaintiff	   agreed	   to	   this	   contract	   [with	   the	  ETF],	  Defendant	   correspondingly	   agreed	   to	   waive	   fees	  amounting	   to	   $175.	   Defendant	   also	   agreed	   to	   charge	   a	  discounted	  monthly	  rate.	  Therefore,	  when	  Plaintiff	  chose	  to	   terminate	   the	   contract	   in	   the	   twelfth	   month,	   he	   had	  already	  accrued	  a	  benefit	  of	  more	  than	  $175.	  .	  .	  Therefore,	  viewed	   from	   the	   time	   of	   making	   the	   contract,	   the	   ETF	  provision	  provides	  a	  consumer	  with	  a	  rational	  choice.”58	  	  In	   Hutchison,	   the	   ETF	   was	   clearly	   over-­‐compensatory.	   The	  consumer	  terminated	  the	  service	  only	  two	  weeks	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  12-­‐month	   lock-­‐in	  period,	   and	   thus	   the	   service	  provider	   lost	  only	   two	  weeks’	   worth	   of	   profit	   –	   less	   than	   the	   $200	   ETF.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  court	   enforced	   the	   clause,	   because	   the	   consumer	   made	   a	   “rational	  choice”	  –	  an	  informed,	  rational	  choice	  –	  to	  enter	  the	  lock-­‐in	  contract.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  No	  Contract	  provides	  additional	  support	  for	  the	  view	  that	  consumers	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	   informed	  about	  the	  cost	  of	  lock-­‐in.	  The	  “No	  Contract”	  marketing	  campaigns	  appeal	  to	  ETF-­‐averse	  consumers.	   Sellers	   are	   offering	   No	   Contract,	   because	   a	   substantial	  number	   of	   informed	   consumers	   demand	   No	   Contract.	   ETFs	   have	  become	   a	   locus	   of	   competition,	   and	   consumers’	   distaste	   for	   ETFs	  provided	   the	   impetus	   for	   an	   expanding	   advertising	   strategy	   that	  trumpets	   “No	   Contract.”	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   all	   consumers,	   or	  even	   all	   informed	   consumers,	   prefer	   No	   Contract.	   It	   does	  mean	   that	  
                                                57	  Hutchison	   v.	   Yahoo!	   Inc.,	   I396	   F	   Appx	   331,	   333	   (9th	   Cir	   2010).	   See	   also	  Schneider	   v	   Verizon	   Internet	   Servs,	   Inc,	  No.	   09–55580,	   2010	   US	   App	   LEXIS	  19974,	  2010	  WL	  3825502	  (9th	  Cir	  Sept	  27,	  2010).	  58	  Hutchison	  v.	  Yahoo!	  Inc.,	  at	  334.	  




consumers	  who	  choose	   lock-­‐in	  arrangements	  probably	  do	  so	  with	  an	  awareness	   of	   the	   ETFs	   and	   of	   the	   advantages	   they	   are	   trading	   away.	  The	   increasing	   awareness	   and	   competition	   should	   alleviate	   much	   of	  the	  concern	  about	  ETFs.	  	  	  Loyalty	  programs	  are	  a	  different	  story.	  They	   increase	  switching	  costs	   and	  enforce	   lock-­‐in	   –	   just	   like	  ETFs.	  But,	   unlike	  ETFs,	   the	   costs	  they	  impose	  are	  less	  salient.	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  recognize	  the	  burden	  of	  fees	   charged	   upon	   early	   termination;	   it	   takes	  more	   sophistication	   to	  recognize	  the	  trap	  created	  by	  potential	  rewards.	  In	  the	  ETF	  scheme,	  it	  is	  the	  penalty	  that	  consumers	  notice,	  whereas	  in	  the	  loyalty	  program	  it	  is	   the	   reward.	   Consumers	  may	   recognize	   that	   they	   are	  paying	  higher	  prices	   to	   remain	  within	   the	   reward	  network	   and	  qualify	   for	   the	  next	  level	  of	  “elite”	  status	  within	  the	  loyalty	  program.	  But	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  compare	  the	  higher	  prices	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  reward,	  and	  to	  see	  that	  the	  overall	  effect	  of	  this	  scheme	  is	  (often)	  a	  net	  loss.	  	  	  Moreover,	  fine	  print	  restrictions	  that	  limit	  the	  value	  of	  the	  loyalty	  rewards	  are	  largely	  invisible	  to	  consumers.59	  Sellers	  can	  thus	  reap	  the	  lock-­‐in	   benefit	   of	   loyalty	   programs,	   without	   incurring	   the	   cost	   of	  actually	  providing	  the	  full,	  anticipated	  benefit.	  Here,	  legal	  intervention	  could	   play	   an	   important	   role.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   these	   practices	   are	  deceptive,	   consumer	   protection	   statutes	   could	   be	   invoked	   and	  regulatory	   action	   may	   be	   called	   for.	   And	   yet	   sellers	   may	   be	   savvy	  enough	   to	   avoid	   deceptive	   promotions	   of	   their	   loyalty	   programs.	  Therefore,	   one	   hopes	   that	   consumers	   would	   learn	   to	   recognize	   the	  pitfalls	  of	   loyalty	  programs,	  as	  they	  learned	  to	  appreciate	  the	  costs	  of	  penalty-­‐based	   lock-­‐in	   schemes.	   Information	   intermediaries	   can	  facilitate	  such	   learning	  by	  disseminating	  scores	  and	  ratings	  of	   loyalty	  programs	  and	  their	  effectiveness.	  	  
	  
III.	  	  CONCLUSION:	  THE	  ALLURE	  OF	  NO	  CONTRACT	  	   It	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  discern	  why	  the	  “No	  Contract”	  label	  has	  been	  so	  successful	   in	  attracting	  consumers.	  Hidden	  fees	  penalizing	  consumers	  for	   various	   patterns	   of	   use	   or	   non-­‐use	   have	   proliferated	   in	   the	  consumer	   contract	   universe.	   A	   consumer	   signs	   up	   for	   a	   service,	   and	  
                                                59	  There	   are	   exceptions.	   For	   instance,	   CapitalOne	   “What’s	   in	   Your	   Wallet”	  campaign	   emphasized	   fine-­‐print	   restrictions	   in	   loyalty	   programs	   offered	   by	  competing	  issuers.	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